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This thesis contains four papers. While the first three take a micro labor perspective, the 
fourth takes an international macro perspective. The common theme in the first three papers 
is the acquisition and destruction of human capital. The fourth was inspired by a seminar 
given by Jacques Melitz in the EUI seminar series on European Monetary Integration. Just 
as the other papers in this thesis, it uses panel data.
The first paper is concerned with explaining the interaction between (university) educa­
tion and the labour market for youths in Italy and Germany. The second paper looks at the 
causal effect of education on earnings. The third paper estimates the earnings losses incurred 
by displaced workers. The fourth paper examines the channels and extent of international 
risk-sharing in the short run and in the long run.
The first paper is motivated by a striking empirical fact. Italy’s university dropout rate 
of more than 60% is the highest of all OECD countries and thus contrasts sharply with 
Germany’s dropout rate of 25%. I develop a model of university enrollment and job search 
that helps to understand the differences between the two countries. For Italy, I identify 
two main groups of dropouts. Misguided students axe ill-prepared to obtain an academic 
degree. Parking lot students drop out as soon as they get the first suitable job offer but 
obtain a degree in case they never get a job offer throughout their studies. In Germany, only 
misguided dropouts exist, and there are fewer of them than in Italy. As to the common theme 
of human capital, this paper show's that in the absence of clearing (youth) labor markets, 
individuals might over- or underinvest in human capital.
High school completion rates vary considerably across West-German counties (Land- 
kreise) and are highly correlated with measures of schooling infrastructure. In the second 
paper, we argue that ’place of childhood’ as a proxy of schooling infrastructure is a con­
vincing exogenous source of variation in schooling levels that allows us to identify the causal 
effect of schooling for wfell-defined subgroups of the population. Using the variable treatment 
intensity approach exposed by Angrist and Imbens (1995) \\Te find that individuals from ’poor 
family background’ respond most strongly to the instrument ’place of childhood’. Their re-
ix
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sponse is further most pronounced at low schooling levels whereas the response of individuals 
with ’rich family background’ is most pronounced at higher schooling levels. Finally, this 
approach allows us to detect changes in the response function over time.
The literature on human capital distinguishes between general and specific human capital. 
When being displaced, a worker loses that part of his human capital stock that is not 
transferable to the new job and incurs a corresponding earnings loss. My third paper adds 
to the recent contributions about displacement in Germany (e.g. Bender, Dustmann, and 
Meghir, 1998, and Burda and Mertens, 2001). It exploits the German Socioeconomic Panel 
in which the type of job separations is reported by workers. I do not find losses caused 
by displacement for the whole sample. However, this is due to significant heterogeneity 
between two meaningful subgroups: while workers at high risk of being displaced do not lose 
by displacement, those at low risk of being displaced lose about 16 percent in earnings in 
the years following displacement.
The fourth paper uses a panel of 23 industrialised countries to investigate how short-run 
and long-run income risks are shared and how the source of uncertainty matters for the 
wray this risk gets insured. Surprisingly, short-term and long-term output risks are found 
to be equally well insured. Transitory shocks get smoothed almost completely whereas 
permanent shocks remain 80 percent uninsured. We find a somewhat more important role for 
international capital markets than earlier studies. Whereas our results tie in with some recent 
theoretical insights and are consistent with empirical findings on home bias in international 
portfolios, they raise the question why permanent shocks are so hard to insure internationally.
The data sets used in this thesis are described in the relevant chapters. To avoid rep­
etition, an overview of the German Socioeconomic Panel, which I use in three chapters, is 
given in Appendix A.
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Chapter 1
W hy D on’t Italians Finish University?
1.1 Introduction
After reaching compulsory schooling age, students can either stay in education or drop 
out. In a world without uncertainty, students would choose their optimal level of schooling 
once and for all at the beginning of their educational career, taking into account labor 
market and earnings opportunities, interest rates, personal discount rates, and their ability. 
In reality, however, many of these factors are uncertain. We therefore observe transitions 
between education, employment and unemployment in all directions. Education plays an 
interesting role in so far as it supposedly increases one’s labor market opportunities at the 
same time as it stops him from earning money. This trade-off is wrell known from the 
literature on optimal schooling. Yet, if youths do not find a job, education can play a dual 
role: being a parking lot for people willing to enter the labor market and at the same time 
of increasing their labor market opportunities. This first effect seems to be particularly true 
for Italy’s university students. Italy’s university dropout rate is the highest of all OECD 
countries. As a consequence Italy also has one of the lowest rates of people holding a tertiary 
degree. In contrast, Germany’s university dropout rate is much lower and overall educational 
attainment higher than in Italy. In this paper, I address the factors explaining university 
enrollment and dropout behavior in both countries and present a job search model that takes 
into account the role of university education.
The paper is related to several strands of literature. Human capital theory provides a 
theory for the demand for education (Gary S. Becker, 1993). It considers education as an 
investment good which individuals acquire until the expected returns from an additional year 
equal the expected costs: in its simplest version students (respectively their parents) choose
1
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the optimal level of education at the beginning of their lives trading off expected direct 
(tuition fees) and indirect (foregone earnings) costs against expected benefits (higher future 
earnings) given personal discount rates. In empirical work, often (optimal) schooling choice 
is not the primary object of study but only used indirectly in studies of returns to education 
as first stage in instrumental variables earnings regressions where schooling is considered an 
endogenous variable.
The literature on school enrollment trends (see e.g. Card and Lemieux, 1997 and Card 
and Lemieux, 2000) explicitly studies educational attainment of different cohorts across 
regions and time. Card and Lemieux (2000) extend a standard model of optimal schooling 
choice in two ways. First, they explicitly allow for distaste for schooling, thereby giving 
more scope to family background variables. Second, they allow for temporary shocks to the 
(local) labor market that may induce students to drop out earlier or to stay longer than 
originally planned. My paper is very much related to this literature although it takes an 
individual-level perspective and a different theoretical approach.
The literature on school-to-work transitions is very much related to this paper. Labor 
market transition patterns are studied using transition probability matrices, mobility indica­
tors and multinomial logit estimation. Soro-Bonmati (2000) presents results based on these 
approaches for Germany, Italy and Spain. How'ever, she only considers transitions between 
1993 and 1995, thus only one cross-section of transitions, and therefore she cannot control 
for regional effects.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 , I present the basic empirical facts. In 
section 3, I develop a job search model with two skill types, unskilled and skilled, in w'hich 
the unskilled (high school graduates) can go to university, and become skilled (university 
graduates). Obtaining a degree and becoming skilled takes time and the model nicely show's 
how' depending on their expected time to completion, some individuals might drop out of 
education before obtaining a degree if they get a job offer. The model is able to explain 
transitions between education, employment, and unemployment. Starting from the equations 
of the theoretical model, in section 4 I describe how the model can be brought to the data 
using maximum likelihood techniques. In section 5, I present the results of the estimation. 
In section 6 , 1 conclude and provide some policy implications.
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1.2 Some facts
1.2.1 Italy
In Italy, in 1995, the percentage of those aged 25 to 34 holding at least a secondary degree 
(diploma or qualified professionale) was at 59.9% while being equal to 32.3% for the 35 to 65 
years old.1 The percentage of those holding a university entry-certificate (diplomati) was at 
54.2% for the 25-34 year old and 28.2% for those aged 35 to 65. This shows a trend towards 
higher education in Italy. Yet, obtaining a tertiary degree is rather unattractive compared 
to other countries. Non-college tertiary education is basically inexistent. Short degrees 
equivalent to a bachelor (laurea breve) were only introduced recently (1992-93) and reaching 
a university degree therefore required at least 5 years of study. The low rate of return to 
education of two to three percent (Flabbi (2000) and Manacorda (2000)) can hardly make 
up for the foregone earnings incurred during studies. For this reason, the percentage of 
those holding a university degree was at 12.2% for the 25-34 age group and at 7.7% for 
the 35-65 year old which is low compared to international standards. There are interesting 
differences across genders and regions, though. University graduation rates are higher for 
women than for men. In the south of Italy still nowadays, 10% of all youth do not finish 
compulsory education. There are also remarkable differences in high school graduation rates 
and university graduation rates across regions. I will exploit these regional differences in the 
empirical analysis below.
The overall low university graduation rate contrasts with a very high rate of first-year 
enrollment (About 70% of all high school leavers go on to university.* 2) Those two facts put 
together describe Italy’s elevated university dropout rate which is the topic of this study. 
Most dropouts occur between the first and second year of study. About 25% of all first-year 
students do not continue in the second year.
Another phenomenon characterizing the difficulty Italian university students face in pur­
suing their studies is the high percentage of students lagging behind regular study times 
(fuori corso). More than 80% of all graduates need more time than foreseen to finish their 
degree. In the academic year 1995/96, amongst all graduates, 45.9% finished 3 or more years 
later than foreseen.3
In figure 1 .1 ,1 plot enrollment rates of the 20-24 year old by region and gender over time 
obtained from the Italian SHIW data. A striking feature of the data is the drop in enrollment
^ h i s  section is based on the author’s calculations using the 1995 SHIW data.
2However, this percentage has been slightly decreasing in recent years due to increased tuition fees.
3See ’’Università e lavoro: statistiche per orientarsi" (1stat, 1999).
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in 1989. The first idea that comes to mind is that this might have to do with a boom in the 
economy that induces a lot of youths to start working instead of studying. This hypothesis is 
refuted by the data. In figure 1 .3 ,1 show GDP in Italy over the 80s and 90s, which does not 
show any irregularity of this kind. A deeper look into institutional features, however, reveals 
the true cause of this drop in enrollment in 1989. In the late 80s, the Italian government 
promoted the so-called contratti di formazione e lavoro (CFL), a sort of apprenticeship for 
youths, and gave huge subsidies to firms to hire young workers. As shown by Adam and 
Canziani [1998], the number of these special contracts attained its all-time high in the late 
80s and later on was reduced because of tighter public budgets.
All o f these facts about school and university enrollment have to be seen in the light 
of the problem of Italian youths to integrate into the labor market. Figure 1.4 shows the 
development of youth unemployment between 1984 and 1997 for Italy in comparison to 
Germany. Italy’s youth unemployment rate lies consistently above 30% except for the period 
1988-1992 in which the contratti di formazione e lavoro temporarily absorbed a lot of youths. 
In contrast, Germany’s youth unemployment rate is considerably and consistently lower. 
Why is youth unemployment so pronounced in Italy?
The Italian youth labor market is characterized by job queues. Prime-age men are highly 
protected and basically cannot be fired. This prevents competititon between youths and 
adults for existing jobs. Youths can only enter the labour market when some older workers 
retire or die. It is a weird institutional feature that some labor contracts even arrange for 
the bequest of an adult’s job to his child by renouncing to a fraction of the severance pay.
I will shortly describe some of the institutional features in Italy that have contributed 
to the creation of job queues for youths. Workers in core industries are highly protected 
by the so-called Cassa integrazione sytem. During a downturn in the economy, firms can 
’’temporarily” lay off workers. While laid-off workers still remain officially employees of the 
firm, they receive 80 percent of their previous wage as a kind of unemployment benefit from 
the state. In the upturn of the economy, the firm has to take these same workers back on 
their payroll. Until 1991, according to an Italian law, half of any additional hiring had to 
be allocated from a list of unemployed horn the local state employment agency ( Ufficio di 
Collocamento). Only the other half wTas at free choice to the firm.
Another contributing factor to the creation of job queues is the focus of the Italian 
social assistance on the family and not on the individual. Italian youths cannot claim 
unemployment benefits unless they have been employed before. Since most of the unemployed 
youths are first-job seekers, this ties them to their families and at the same time reduces
Mtwmm imnunamyNMir
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their search activity because they are ”in a safe place”.4
1.2.2 Germ any
In Germany, in 1995, the percentage of those aged 25 to 34 holding at least a secondary 
degree5 was at 649c while being equal to 56.4% for the 35 to 65 year old, based on GSOEP 
data. Thus, there is a trend towards higher education also in Germany, yet starting from a 
higher level. In particular, in the 1980s and 1990s, women quickly caught up in educational 
attainment and in the middle of the 1990s even overtook men in many dimensions: the rate 
of females starting university is by now slightly higher for women than for men.
Also Germany did not have short degrees (bachelors) until recently (1997).
Germany is well-known for its vocational training system integrating class-room teaching 
and on-the job training with firms. The higher number of people with an apprenticeship 
is part of the explanation for the much higher rate of secondary degrees compared with 
Italy. Looking more specifically at degrees allowing access to university education (Abitur 
or Fachhochschulreife in Germany and laurea in Italy), the opposite is true: in 1995, 26.2% 
of 25 to 34 year old Germans had either Abitur or Fachhochschulreife, while this was true 
for 17.5% of the 35 to 65 year old.
As for university degrees, Germans again overtake Italians. While 13.4% of 25-34 year 
old Germans hold a university degree, it is 12.2% of Italians of the same age.
It is important to keep in mind, however, that the German educational system provides 
for many different educational opportunities. A lot of students, after working for some time, 
or after doing an apprenticeship, decide to return to formal education. This is known as 
zweiter Bildungsweg (second-chance education). In Italy, this option is much less common: 
the latest OECD figures (Education at a glance, 2000) show that for the 1998 German 
cohort, 28% of them will enter university at some point in their life. For Italians, it is 42%. 
Comparing this to the percentage of people holding a university entry-certificate we see that 
for Italians the decision to go to university is a now-or-never decision while the German 
system is much more flexible in allowing many different educational and career paths.
In figure 1 .2 ,1 plot enrollment rates of the 20-24 year old by region and gender over time 
obtained from the German GSOEP data. Again, there is considerable variation in enrollment
4See Becker, Bentolila, and Ichino (2001) and Manacorda and Moretti (2001).
5i.e. having done at least an apprenticeship (Lehre), finished a specialized vocational school (Berufsfach- 
schule), or holding an upper secondary schooling degree (Abitur) or having the Fachhochschulreife allowing 
access to technical colleges. For more details concerning the different school types see the section describing 
the school system.
W ! il
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rates across regions, genders and time.
1.2.3 The dropout phenomenon in historical perspective
The Longitudinal Survey of Italian families (Indagine longitudinale suite famiglie italiane, 
ILF1) is a data set that allows to study the dropout phenomenon in historical perspective. 
The ILFI questionnaire collects detailed biography information. One question asks for the 
year of university enrolment, and the following one if a university degree was obtained. 
One of the possible answers is that the person dropped out of university in which case 
she is asked the year of dropout. This information allows us to compute dropout rates by 
year of enrolment several decades back. Figure 1.5 plots dropout rates for five-year periods 
between 1936-40 and 1986-90. Dropout rates have increased considerably from 15% in the 
late thirties to 50% in the seventies and eighties. There are many different reasons behind 
this considerable rise. First of all, with educational attainment being much lower, and in 
particular the percentage of youths holding an upper secondary degree (making them eligible 
for university enrolment) lower, earlier cohorts of students were smaller and most likely more 
selected in a terms of ability (if we think of innate ability as being similarly distributed over 
time) and therefore less likely to fail. The increase in the percentage of youths holding an 
upper secondary degree enlarged the pool of students eligible for university. While before 
1968, only youths graduating from classical high school were allowed to enter university, 
after 1968 all upper secondary degrees allowed university entry. Thus, in addition to the 
general trend in educational attainment, eligibility criteria for university enrolment were 
relaxed. Second, over much of the post-World War II period, the rise in university dropout 
rates is accompanied by a similar trend in youth unemployment rates. These two factors, 
an increase in the number of youths eligible for university and a lack in their labor market 
prospects immediately after finishing high school (job queues) might have jointly led to the 
increase in university dropout rates over a long period. While lack of data prevents us from 
rigorously explaining the historical dimension of the university dropout phenomenon, we can 
have a closer look at the interaction of labor market conditions and university enrolment and 
dropout in the late eighties and the nineties, for which we have better data.
1.2.4 Preliminary evidence for Italy based on data about high 
school graduates
To get a first idea of the forces behind the Italian dropout phenomenon, in this section I am 
going to exploit a survey data set from the Italian National Statistical Office (Istat). It is
1.2. SOME FACTS
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a representative sample of the year 1995 high school graduates. In 1998, a sample of 18843 
students was contacted by phone and asked questions about labor market and education 
experience during high school and in the three years after leaving high school. In addition, 
their schools were asked to provide information on students’ performance in high school. 
The major drawback of the data is its limitation to just one cohort of diplomatic Yet, it is 
the only existing data source that allows to directly study the dropout phenomenon. I give 
some descriptive statistics in table 1.1.
Of the 8730 high school leavers that enroll in a corso di laurea (i.e. a long degree study) 
between 1995 and 1998, 8092 (i.e. 92.7%) do so immediately after leaving high school, i.e. in 
fall 1995.6 To study the dropout phenomenon I select this subgroup because we can follow it 
for full three years and, from the information provided in 1998, see who is still in university 
and who dropped out. So, here we only lose a tiny fraction of students who first did their 
military service, or worked etc, and only later on wont on to university. Using this well- 
defined subgroup wo end up with a sample of 7495 individuals after deleting observations 
with missing observations on variables of interest.
In table 1.2, the dropout rate is broken up by type of upper secondary school. The dif­
ferences are striking: the dropout rate amongst students graduating from vocational tracks 
(istituto professional and istituto tecnico) is several times higher than for students graduat­
ing from classical high school (liceo). Also note that the overall dropout computed from our 
sample is quite low' compared to the OECD figure of more than 60%. This can be explained 
by several arguments: our dropout rates only apply to dropouts within the first three years 
of study w'hile the OECD figure applies to the overall dropout rate, i.e. it also includes late 
dropouts. Additionally, the above OECD figure applies to the peak in dropout rates in 1990 
while the present data are for the 2nd half of the 1990s. After a sharp increase in tuition 
fees in the early 90s first-time university enrollment decreased, most probably lowering the 
number of misguided students.
In order to identify the factors behind the dropout phenomenon, I estimate a probit 
model7 where the dependent variable is equal to 1 for university dropouts, and 0 otherwise. 
The results are displayed in table 1.3. The most interesting finding is the significant difference 
in the probability to drop out across different school types even controlling for performance 
in both junior and senior high school. Students graduating from vocational secondary tracks 
(istituto professionale or istituto tecnico) are much more likely to drop out of university than
6This is in sharp contrast with Germany where a lot of students enroll only after an intermediate period 
of work or apprenticeship.
7I also estimated a linear probability model which yielded basically the same results.
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axe graduates from classical high school (liceo). This result raises doubts about the idea of 
allowing access to university to everyone. Students coming from professional or technical 
secondary schools on average do not seem to bring enough academic skills to survive in 
university. Interestingly, not only does the average grade when leaving high school (voto 
di maturità) positively influence the probability to stay in university but also does the 
average grade in junior high school (voto di scuola media inferiore). So, even conditional 
on the ’’ability” right before entering university, the "ability” several years before going 
to uni vers it}’ matters. While the number of siblings does not influence the probability to 
drop out, parents’ education - measured by the maximum of mother’s and father’s years 
of schooling - matters a lot. The more educated are the parents, the higher the student’s 
probability to stay in university. This result is remarkable because it shows up although we 
control for performance in both junior and senior high school.8 Finally, students that are 
older at high school graduation have a higher probability of dropping out. Number of classes 
repeated does not significantly enter once we control for age.
What I take from this exercise is the fact that a lot of students are clearly misguided 
to university. This is particularly true for students coming from technical or professional 
secondar}’ tracks, both of which are not supposed to prepare for academic studies in the 
first place. Answers of dropouts as to why they dropped out (table 1.4) show that a high 
percentage of students found their studies too difficult and thereby corroborates the finding 
that too many low ability students are allowed to enter university in the first place. It also 
highlights the misconception by students about what university is and what their chances 
are to obtain a degree in the specific subject of their choice.9
Yet, it is striking to see that more than one quarter of the dropouts drops out because 
they already found a job. Additionally, it is interesting that the majority of those who drop 
out because they found the studies too difficult, are working in 1998, so a large number 
of them might not only have dropped out because the studies were too difficult but also 
because their job prospects were sufficiently positive.10 This interpretation is supported by
8 However, parents’ education might pick up the effect of family income, a variable we cannot control for.
9 For this reason, in 1998, the Italian Ministry of Public Education introduced a system of pre-registration 
f http://w w w .istruzione.it/cirgomenti/orientamento/orpreiscriziom.htm) by which students who wish to  go 
to university after leaving high school can informally enroll in a subject of their choice. Then, a close 
cooperation between high schools and universities is set up: schools are being provided with informative 
literature and schools organize visits to nearby universities for trial lessons. In Germany, a system of 
following regular classes at university during the last year at high school to get an idea of what university is 
like, has been already set up many years ago.
10This is a standard problem in surveys when only one answer can be given.
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the fact that the percentage of students that claim to drop out because they found the studies 
too difficult is much higher in the North (41.3%) - where labor market conditions are very 
favorable for youths - than in the South (29.9%) - where the youth labor market problem is 
most pronounced.11
The evidence collected suggests that there are two main groups of dropouts: misguided 
students, mainly coming from vocational secondary schools, are ill-prepared to obtain an 
academic degree. Parking lot students drop out as soon as they get the first suitable job 
offer.
In the next section, I present a simple theoretical model capturing the interaction between 
university education and the labor market that can rationalize why so many high school 
graduates enroll in university and why such a high fraction of them later drops out.
1.3 Time-to-educate in a job search model
1.3.1 The basic version of the model
Consider a continuous time model with two skill types, unskilled and skilled. We can think 
of the skilled as holding a university degree and the unskilled as being high school graduates 
without a university degree. The unskilled can go to education, and obtaining a degree, they 
become skilled. Unskilled workers can be either unemployed, in education, or employed, 
while skilled workers can only be unemployed or employed. Denote by Uu the expected 
present discounted value (PDV) of income of an unskilled unemployed, and by U8 the PDV 
of income for a skilled unemployed. By Wu and Ws denote the PDV of being an unskilled 
employed and of being a skilled employed, respectively, and by Eu the PDV of being an 
unskilled in education. UUy U81 \VU, W8y and Eu can be given asset interpretations and their 
relationship can be written in the form of arbitrage equations. Remark that I do not model 
the firm side here. Of course, this could be easily done but I abstract from it for two reasons: 
for the clarity of the exposition and for the reason that in the empirical part I do not have 
data on the firm side anyway.
Let b be the value of the outside option (we might think of it as unemployment benefits), 
wu the wage rate of the unskilled and w8 the wage rate for the skilled, all of which are 
taken to be exogenous.1 2 By r denote the rate of time preference. Assume that an unskilled
11 An alternative explanation would be that universities are more demanding in the North.
12Since the number of school-leavers entering the labor market is small compared to the total labor force, 
we can reasonably consider school-leavers to be price-takers, with wu and w8 determined by the distribution 
of skills in the population.
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unemployed has a constant probability Au of finding a job at any instant, and a ski lie 
unemployed finds a job with instantaneous probability As. Then, we can write the ass» 
equations defining Uu and U3 as
rUu = b + \ u(\Vu - U u) (1.1
rU, = b + K (W ,-U ,) (1.2
where for the time being we assume b to be the same for the skilled and the unskilled. A  
unskilled can take further education in which case he still receives job offers with probability 
Au that he can accept or reject, and with probability he obtains a degree and become 
skilled.13 We assume that newly graduated individuals first go into unemployment.14 Remarl 
that 7  is indexed by an individual-specific index i allowing for heterogeneity in ”degre< 
achievement rates”. This reflects the fact that the expected time for reaching a degree 
varies considerably by individual. 7 i can be interpreted as individual ability and the setup 
therefore captures the idea that more able students obtain a degree more quickly than lesi 
able students. When the outside option remains b, we can write the asset equation defining 
Eu as
rEUti =  6 -b 7 i(Ua -  EUji) +  Aumax(Wu -  £ U|i, 0)
In this first setup, the asset equations for Wu and Ws are very simple:
(1.3)
rW„ =  k;u (1.4)
r\Vs =  ws (1.5)
It is very important to stress that all of the arrival rates Au, As, and 7* in my model are 
instantaneous probabilities. Put differently, they are hazard rates of leaving a certain state, 
conditional on having been in that state until now. They can take values between 0 and 
infinity. Also remark that I assume all hazard rates to be constant, i.e. independent of the 
time elapsed in a given state. This is to say that occurrence of events is regulated by Poisson 
processes. Poisson processes are know'n to be memoryless processes. One crucial implication
13Implicit in this setup is the assumption that only degrees matter and that some education but no degree 
is no better than no education at all. The assumption that only degrees matter is known as sheepskin effects.
14 This assumption is reasonable given that graduates do not start working immediately following their 
graduation.
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of this assumption is that the probability of leaving a state does not increase over time, i.e. 
one is not more likely to leave a state if he has been in it for a longer time span. For instance, 
considering the ’’degree achievement rate” y it this means that conditional on already having 
been in university for a couple of years one has the same expected time to completion as 
someone who just enters university (i.e. conditional on having been in university for a very 
short time). This is of course a very strong assumption which is a better description of 
enrollment behavior for students at the beginning of their studies. In a future extension to 
the model, I want to consider other types of processes that allow for increasing hazard rates 
to make the model more realistic also for later years of study.
To see which economic variables drive the decision to continue education or to drop out, 
consider an unskilled individual in education. When a job offer arrives, he can either accept 
or reject it. Given the heterogeneity in ’’degree achievement rates”/ability, there will be 
a marginal type of individual who is exactly indifferent between continuing education and 
dropping out. For this individual, the condition Wu =  EU)i holds. Solving equation (1.1) for 
Uu and equation (1.2) for Us and substituting in equations (1.4) and (1.5) respectively, we 
obtain the following expressions
Uu = 1r +  Au(& +  AuWu) = 7T T ^b + T ^ (1.6)
U. =  — L - ( t  +  X.W.) =  - k - (6  +  ^ w .)
r +  Aj r + As r
(1.7)
For the marginal individual, the last term in equation (1.3) disappears because of the 
condition Wu — EU)i and therefore equation (1.3) can be rewritten as
=  - ¡ — (b+ 7 i i y  =  - ! — (* '+ - x t  I*+r +  7 i r +  7 i r +  A5 r (1.8)
The condition Wu — Eu can be expressed as
Wu
r
1
(t +  7 A )  =
1
(6 H-----+  — w.])
r +  7* r +  A, r 1 (1.9)r +  7t
This expression defines a threshold value 7d for an individual indifferent between con­
tinuing education and dropping out. For individuals with 7* >  7d the last term in (1.3) 
disappears and they continue education until they obtain a degree. For individuals with 
7 i < 7d both the second and the third term in (1.3) are ’’active” and whatever event comes 
first, degree or job offer, they turn skilled or they drop out.
)! }
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Even without explicitly solving for 7d, we can apply the implicit function theorem15 to see 
how different parameter values affect individuals at the margin (and thereby also individuals 
off the margin) in (1.9). We set b — 0 for simplicity and can write
•ws — wu ~ 0 (1.10)r *f 7d r -f Xs
Holding all other parameters constant, a marginal increase in the wages of the unskilled, 
wu, induces more people to drop out of education:
. 7 * ( « o  =  k S ^ > o .
Similarly,
•  'YJ,(iv,) =  <  0
A marginal increase in the wages of the skilled, wst provides an incentive for students to 
stay in university.
• 7 * (* .)  =  -
(r+7d)7<'
(r+A,)A, < 0
As the job arrival rate for skilled unemployed, A3, goes up, more students tend to continue 
university. Notice that the job arrival rate for unskilled unemployed, Au, does not enter the 
optimum.
■ 7*(r) = > 0
An increase in the discount rate, r, has a positive effect on staying in university.
Conditioning on the values of all other parameters (which uniquely determine the cutoff 
level 7d), differences in the ability distribution ƒ (7 :) will affect the fraction of dropouts. If 
the group of students holding a university-entry certificate is less able in country 1 than  
in country 2, then we expect more students to drop out of university. This describes the 
selection issue associated with university entry. If a country allows more students to enter 
university to begin with (Italy vs. Germany) and wre assume innate ability to be the same 
for both countries, by definition a higher number of less able students enter university than
15Implicit function theorem: Let G(x1y) be a C 1 function on a ball about (xo,t/o) in R 2- Suppose that 
G(xo,j/o) =  c and consider the expression G(x,y)  =  c. If {dG/dy)(xQ,yo) ^  0, then there exists a C 1 
function y = y(x)  defined on an interval I  about the point xq such that: (a) G(x,j/(x)) =  c for all x in I,  
(b) y(x0) =  so, and (c) *'(*„) =
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if access was restricted. This in turn explains a lot of the Italian dropout phenomenon. To 
give an example, assume that 7 i is symmetrically distributed with £ [7t] =  yd. As the right 
tail of the distribution becomes fatter, the fraction of stayers increases while the fraction of 
dropouts increases in the opposite case. In order to compute the fraction of dropouts from 
the model, assume that ^  is distributed over the interval (0, oc) following a distribution 
function F{7{). Then the expected fraction of dropouts is given by F(7d).
In this first version of the model, only four states out of five actually occur. Unskilled 
individuals will always prefer education to unemployment because both their outside option 
b and the job arrival rate Au are the same in both states but in education they might also 
obtain a degree. In reality, however, we do observe unskilled in unemployment. This feature 
of the model can be changed by assuming the job arrival rate in education to be lower than 
in unemployment. This version of the model is exposed in the following section.
Also, in this first setup, there is no job destruction and therefore all individuals will 
finally end up in employment (given that wages are taken to be exogenous and therefore will 
not adjust the increased labor supply). Employment is an absorbing state. Job destruction 
can be easily introduced in the model by assuming an exogenous job destruction at rate 6U 
for unskilled jobs and at rate 6S for skilled jobs. Equations (1.4) and (1.5) can be modified 
to read
rWu =  iu„ +  £u(E/„ -  W.) (1.11)
tW, =  w, +  S,(U, -  W,) (1.12)
This modified set of equations (1.1)-(1.3) and (1.11)-(1.12) can again be solved for an 
expression defining a marginal individual indifferent between staying in and dropping out of 
education. Details for this setup are shown in the appendix.
1.3.2 Introducing different job arrival rates in unemployment and 
education
We saw that in the basic version of the model, no unskilled are observed in unemployment 
because EUii > JJU. When job arrival rates while in education are as big as they are while in 
unemployment, education is more attractive because it additionally provides for the chance 
of obtaining a degree.
T -.rirrn rr^ t:
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In equation (1.3) we can introduce a job arrival rate 7)u <  Au. This may be reasonabl 
if being in education is associated with less time for job search than being unemployed 
Equation (1.3) then reads
rEUji -  b +  Ji iUs -  EU(i) 4- rju max(Wu -  EUii, 0) (1.13
Now, wre want to see w'hen EUii >  Uu. From the previous analysis (see equation (1.9)) vn 
know that the threshold 7d is independent from Au. We can therefore distinguish two cases
•  7 i <  and hence Wu > EUfiy and
•  7 i >  and hence Wu < EUii.
In the first case, the last term in (1.13) does not disappear and we can write
Fu,i =
1
■[fc+7iC/', +  77uW tl] =
1
r +  7i +  ??u ....................... " J  r +  7 i +  7ju
For simplicity set b =  0. Then, EUti > Uu reads
t6+ 7i{ T r r ( i,+;T “'»^+ ’7»'rl (1J4)* T  -A 5 * *
7t A, ■wa + Vu ^■Wu >  ------—UV (1.15)
(r +  7 i + »7u)r  +  A4 3 ' ( r +  74 +  q j  r +  Au
This equation defines a new threshold value 7 e <  7d, that determines whether an unskilled 
prefers to remain unemployed or to go to education. If 7 * < 7% the chance of obtaining a 
degree is so low* that it cannot trade off the lowTer job arrival rate in education. If 7* >  7 e, 
the lower job arrival rate in education is set off by a high enough degree achievement rate 
and therefore makes going to education worthwhile.
The second case is much simpler: since always Uu < \VU but at the same time Wu < EUjt 
in this second case, we find Uu < Eu>i and therefore everyone with 7{ >  7d goes to education. 
This is self-evident after studying the previous case: observing that 7 * > 7d >  7* yields the 
same result.
To sum up: in the case in which the job arrival rate for the unskilled in education is 
lower than in unemployment, there are three cases:
• 7 i <  7 e: those with a very low' ability choose to remain unemployed instead of going 
to education
•  7e < 7 i <  l d: in this intermediate case, unskilled individuals choose to go into educa­
tion but drop out of education as soon as they obtain a job offer
BBBIMMM JUUIMUJUUL HMBBBHI!HtM ff WE f! BH Bfk!1 ifflf! 3 fm i i !  jBWWWPW WHWH W M  W W IUW W W .-----m .
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• 7i >  l d‘ unskilled individuals with high ability prefer education to unemployment and 
stay in education until obtaining a degree even in the presence of job offers
Figure 1.6 describes the possible cases.
Again, we can apply the implicit function theorem to (1.15) to see how different parameter 
values affect individuals at the margin of enrolling in university or remaining unemployed. 
Holding all other parameters constant, a marginal increase in the wages of the unskilled, wu, 
induces more people to remain unemployed:
• 7e/(U?u) =  =  Ut~Uu > 0'
r+Aj r+A^
This is the case because the numerator is positive since Xu > r\u and the denominator 
is Us — Uu > 0. In contrast, an increase in the wages of the skilled, wsi incentivates more 
students to enroll in education:
• 7a(w,) =  -¿ ¡U fa  < 0.
In the same way, as the job arrival rate for skilled unemployed, As, goes up, more students 
enroll in education:
Lh-U* < 0
An increase in the job arrival rate for the unskilled unemployed increases the number of 
people preferring to remain unemployed and the opposite is true for an increase in the job 
arrival rate while in education:
7*(au) = rf% y  > o
< 0
In order to compute the fraction of dropouts in this case of the model, assume again 
that is distributed over the interval (0, oo) with distribution function F ^ ) .  Then the 
expected fraction of dropouts is given by •
Remark that in a cross-section of individuals there are two margins affecting enrollment 
behavior: the unskilled can choose to enroll or not and the enrolled can choose to accept job 
offers when they arrive or to reject them. The decision to drop out does not change with 
respect to the basic version of the model. Behavior of individuals at both margins together 
determines overall enrollment behavior. Interestingly, comparative statics at both margins
i n
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give an unambiguous answer on enrollment behavior. For instance, a higher skilled wage both  
increases the number of individuals who start education (’’entry margin”) and increases the 
number of individuals who reject job offers while in education (’’exit margin”). Therefore, 
the unambiguous effect of an increase in skilled wages is a higher fraction of individuals in 
education. What is ambiguous is the implication for the dropout rate. To see this, consider 
an increase in the skilled wage ws: both j d and 7 ' go down and the shift of 7d relative to  7 e 
determines wrhether goes up or down.
In the empirical part, I am going to analyze this version of the model employing a 
maximum likelihood procedure.
1.4 Maximum likelihood estimation
On the basis of the theoretical model there are four different groups of individuals:
• never-takers never enroll
• actual dropouts first enroll in university and later on drop out because they obtain a 
suitable job offer
• potential dropouts enroll in university, and are at risk of dropping out but simply do 
not happen to get a suitable job offer and finally obtain a university degree
• always-takers enroll and never drop out, even in the presence of job offers
Every individual belongs to exactly one of the four groups with probabilities 
i^,PDi fti,AT respectively. Yj =  1 if individual i belongs to group j ,  otherwise it is 0. This 
means that =  I and £  Yj — 1- The likelihood contribution of individual i is then
given by
(1.16)
To be able to assess the estimation of this empirical model, an ideal data set would contain 
the following information besides standard personal and family characteristics which I use 
as proxies for individual ability:
•  number and time of job offers received by each individual
• exact wage offered to an individual
rwmrnmtf mmIfHSBW innmai
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Yet, I do not have information on job offers and wage offers by individual. They can only 
be proxied by some empirical counterpart which I describe in the following section.
Furthermore, ideally we would have a panel data set of high school graduates that contains 
information for the whole period between their year of graduation from high school until their 
late twenties. Then, we could study both the enrollment decision after finishing high school 
and the decision to continue university or to drop out.
In the Italian SHIW data, however, which basically consist of repeated cross-sections16, 
we observe every youth only once. The only information vre have about her educational 
career is her highest degree obtained and a dummy variable for being in university or not. 
This also implies that we are not able to classify her into one of the four groups.
The German SOEP data, in contrast, are a panel data set and we could exploit its 
longitudinal structure. Still, for reasons of comparability, in this paper I do not employ panel 
estimators on the German data, either. This will be done in a companion paper (Becker, 
2001). What I would like to point out at this stage is that in the absence of information 
on the exact number and time of job offers, even possessing of panel data does not alleviate 
the problem of distinguishing potential dropouts from always-takers. Both groups obtain a 
degree and the crucial piece of information that would allow us to tell them apart is the 
missing information on number and time of job offers.
After explaining the main problems in bringing the theoretical model to the data, we can 
now have a closer look at the actual empirical implementation of the procedure.
1.4.1 Maximum Likelihood Estimation for Italy
In the Italian data, we only observe youths to be in university (Y* =  1) or not (Y* =  0) 
at one single point in time. Lacking further information about her educational career, a 
non-enrolled youth could therefore be either a never-taker or an actual dropout An enrolled 
youth could be either an always-taker or a potential dropout who just did not happen to get 
a job offer yet. Figure 1.7 illustrates the four cases in the Italian data. Understanding this 
"problem” also paves the way out. Although we can not tell with certainty vrhich of the 
four states someone is in, we can attribute the probabilities of being in the respective states. 
This is equivalent to setting up the likelihood function in the following wTay:
lifMYi.Xi) =  P(Y( =  0 )1- y‘P(y, =  l ) y‘ (1.17)
16From 1989-1995, there is a small component of rotating panel. However, it is too small to be analyzed 
separately.
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where
P(Yi — 0) =  P ( <  7e) +  P(7e <  7i < 7 d) * P (job offer received) (1.18)
and
P(Yi =  1) =  P(7 i >  7d) +  P(7 ' <  7» <  7d) * P (no job offer received) (1.19)
where 7 e is the entry threshold and 7d is the dropout threshold and ~fi is the ’’degree 
achievement rate” (which can be thought of as ability).
In order to implement this likelihood function we make the following assumptions:
A ssu m p tio n  1 (Age at enrollment)
Students enroll in university immediately after leaving high school or they never enroll, 
more specifically they enroll at age 19 or never.
This assumption is supported by OECD figures which show that the majority of Italian  
students enrolls at age 19.
A ssu m p tio n  2 (External observer information):
•  The external observer knows that the thresholds 7 e and yd are functions of wages and 
job arrival rates and of an unobservable part:
7 e =  7 '(¿ ) * d' (1.20)
7 í  =  7‘,( I ) » ^ i (1.21)
where L denotes labor market variables and t9e and are distributed according to the 
cdf function G(.).
•  The ability of an individual can be proxied by family characteristics F but there remains 
an unobservable part as well:
7i =  1i{F) * ■d1 (1.22)
where &  is also distributed according to the cdf function G{.).
1.4. MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATION 19
A ssu m p tion  3 (Parametrization of 7 e and 7^)
In the above analysis we did not provide closed-form solutions for 7' and 7d because they 
are rather involved non-linear functions of the labor market variables. As an approximation 
to these non-linear relationships and in accordance with the way hazard rates are typically 
parametrized in duration models, we assume 7* and 7d to be loglinear functions of the labor 
market variables, i.e. 7 C = exp{Lftp) and 7** =  exp(L'xp). To see why this is a not an arbitrary 
parametrization, let us have a look at the Taylor approximation to tyd. Prom equation (1.10) 
it follows that:
7d(a  +  h) «  7d(a) +  j £ ( a ) h i  +  g ( a ) f t j  +  ^ ( a ) h 3 +  ^ ( a )h4 (1.23)
So wre could approximate 7  ^ by a linear function of the labor market variables. The use 
of the exponential has the simple reason that we want 7d to be positive because it represents 
a hazard rate. This does not change the fact that the signs of the coefficients <p and ip 
represent the sign of the derivatives of 7 * and 7** with respect to the labor market variables.
A ssu m p tion  4 (Parametrization of 7*)
Following the example above, wTe parametrize 7* =  exp(F'/c).
A ssu m p tion  5 (Parametrization of the probability of obtaining a job offer while in 
university)
One part of the likelihood function is the probability that a student receives a job offer 
before or after t years in university where t =  ape —19 following assumption 1. Assuming the 
hazard rate r/u to be constant, implies an exponential distribution of the spells in university.
The spells in university thus follow a cdf F(t) =  1 — exp(—rjut). We can parametrize r)u in 
the same wTay as the other hazard rates above: rju =  exp(X'/3)y where X  denotes variables 
proxying the hazard rate.
A ssu m p tion  6 (Distribution of the unobserved components)
To make the model operational, we will assume that
),
• G(.) follows a lognormal distribution, i.e. t?e, and $  can be written as exp(ee), exp(ed),and 
exp(s^) respectively where ee,ed, and e? are normally distributed with standard devi­
ation @ di ^fm
,■ • ee,£d, and are independent.
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With the above assumptions, the EO is able to identify the probability that the different 
outcomes will occur as follows:
If 7 i < 7e, the youth does not enroll in university. The respective probability is
P(ji < 7e) =  P(exp(F'k) exp(ef) < exp(L'ip) exp(e*)) (1-24)
=  P{ef -  se <  L'p -  F'k) = $
where we define a¡t = j^a * + a\ and where 2/e ~  ¿V(0,1).
If 7 ' <  ", < -,d, the youth is in the range of ’’potential dropouts” and can either be (still) 
in university (Y  =  1) or have actually dropped out (V =  0):
The probability of y i being in this intermediate range [7*, 7^ 1 is
P(7 ' <  7f <  7d) = P{L'<P +  e‘ <  F'k +  e> < L'V + ed) (1.26)
=  P {F k +  ef < L'<6 +  cd) -  P(F’k +  ef <  L'<p +  e*) (1.27)
=  P(e! - e d < L’V -  F'k) -  P ie1 - o '  <  V<p -  F'k) (1.28)
- , L 'V -F 'k \ .  I L'V -  F'k 
=  *  *Id< , . | -  4> \ z h  <
\ M +£r; P
=  5> ( zld <  I / —  -  F1— ) -  $  ( z ft <  L'-?~ -  F‘—
V f d  V f d J  \  G f t  O f e
(1.29)
(1.30)
where following the previous definitions a jd =  +  o\ and zfd ~  N (0, 1). The proba­
bility of receiving a job offer in the first t years of study is
P(job offer received < i) = 1 — exp(— exp(^'/?)i) (1-31)
Obviously, the probability of receiving no job offer in the first t years of study is the 
complementary probability
P(no job offer received < t) =  exp(— exp(Xf0)t) (1-32)
(Kflflitit-I-.i
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If 7 i >  7d, the youth will be in university independent of wether he received a job offer 
or not. The respective probability is
P (7i > 7d) =  P(F'k +  €> > L'V +  £d) (1.33)
=  1 -  P(F'k +  ef < L'q  +  ed) (1.34)
=  1 -  P (tl  - e d < L'V -  F'k) (1.35)
, L ' * - F k\
=  1 $  Z/i <  - ---------
V h + a U
(1.36)
= l - $ ( z / d < L ' —  - F 1— )
\  Cjd Vfd)
(1.37)
A ssum ption  7 (Equal variance assumption)
Assume a /d — a which is equivalent to saying <j\ — a \ because in this case c/d =
\ J ° } + ad =
This assumption allows us to identify the coefficients k , and ip up to the scaling factor 
=  i l° it-
Putting together all of these pieces we obtain the likelihood function which is estimated 
in the sequel.
1.4.2 Maximum Likelihood Estimation for Germany
While the Italian data were essentially repeated cross-sections, the GSOEP data are a panel 
data set. This has one big advantage and one disadvantage for our purpose. The big 
advantage is that the GSOEP data are more informative in the sense that we can follow 
individuals over time and thus distinguish an actual dropout from a never-taker. Note that 
in the group of people finishing their degree potential dropouts and always-takers still cannot 
be told apart because we do not have the necessary information.
The disadvantage is that in order to make the results as comparable as possible to Italy, 
we cannot exploit the panel character of the data in the estimation itself. If we w'ould do and 
use several observations per individual, i.e. employing panel data estimators, wre could not 
be sure w'hether differences in results across countries are driven by fundamental differences
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in economic variables or whether they stem from different estimation techniques. For th 
reason, I opt for a rather unusual approach. We use the panel dimension only to  obtain moi 
information on the exact type of individual to be able to distinguish between never-takei 
and actual dropouts and to find out the exact year when students entered university.17 Aftt 
doing this, I randomly draw one observation per individual and from then on treat the dat 
as repeated cross-sections.
Now we can set up the likelihood function in a way very similar to the Italian case. Th 
only difference is that we are able to distinguish between three groups in the German date
never-takers, actual dropouts and the group of people finishing their degree which comprise 
potential dropouts and always-takers.
The likelihood contribution of individual i can written as
h(b; V, Xi) =  K Nr )y""T(*,A £>)y^ D (t ,,fd)y"fd (1.38
where the suffix FD  denotes youths that finish their degree and where
Ki}NT =  P(*fi <  7e) (1-39;
fti,AD — -P(7e <  7 i <  7d)P(no job offer received) (1-40)
if we pick an observation for an actual dropout while she is still in university, and
fti,AD =  P{7e <  7 » <  7d)P(job offer received) (1.41)
if wre pick an observation for an actual dropout when she has already dropped out,
fti,FD =  P (7* >  7d) +  P (7e <  7i <  7d)P(no job offer received) (1-42)
and where y e is the entry threshold, 7d is the dropout threshold and is the ” degree 
achievement rate”.
Apart from assumption 1 which is abandoned because we do observe the actual age at 
enrolment, all other assumptions are adopted from the Italian part.
Now, I can proceed to explain how I constructed the empirical proxies for the labor 
market variables of the theoretical model.
l7Remember th a t for Italy we assumed that students enter university at age 19 or never, which we proved 
to be a very reasonable assumption. In Germany, in contrast, the prevalence of apprenticeships makes this 
an unreasonable assumption. Moreover, we do not have to assume anything about the first year in university 
if we can easily read it from the data.
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1.4.3 Empirical proxies
In the empirical part, I have to choose empirical proxies for the variables of the theoretical 
model. After a lot of experimentation18, the following proxies turned out to be relatively good 
measures. I use the employment-population ratio of 20-24 year old high school graduates as 
a proxy for the job arrival rate of the unskilled, Au, the employment-population ratio of 30-34 
year old university graduates as a proxy for the job arrival rate of the skilled, Aa, and the 
return to university education (college premium) to measure j j .  All of these labor market 
variables L vary by region, gender and year. In contrast, the family background variables 
F vary at the individual level. Parents’ education is measured by the years of schooling of 
the most-educated parent. Log income of the rest of the family (i.e. excluding the income 
of the youth herself) measures financial resources. Both family background variables are 
supposed to proxy for the degree achievement rate (or ability), 7  ^ Further controls are age 
and gender.
1.5 Results
Our main interest lies in the variables defining the entry and dropout thresholds and wre 
would like to see whether indeed the thresholds are affected as predicted by the theoretical 
model. While I do not have specific expectations about the size of the effects, the theoretical 
model is explicit about the direction of the effects, i.e. gives clear predictions about the sign 
of the coefficients. Also should the signs of the coefficients be the same at both thresholds. 
Let us first look at Italy.
1.5.1 Italy
The results (see Table 1.5) are as follows: while at the entry threshold the signs of the coef­
ficients confirm with the predictions of the theory (although not at a high level of statistical 
significance)19, at the dropout threshold only the coefficient on the employment-population 
ratio of high school graduates is in line with the predictions of the model.
At both the entry and the dropout thresholds higher demand for high school graduates 
seems to be associated with the thresholds moving to the right, i.e. with both less ma­
triculations and more dropouts, which is consistent with the predictions of the theoretical
l8See section 1.7.1 below
19See section 1.7.1 for a discussion of the shortcomings of these and further empirical proxies that 1 
experimented with.
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model. Since the statistical significance is rather low, this result has to be taken with care.
At the entry threshold, higher demand for university graduates is associated with more ma­
triculations (although statistically insignificant). The higher the college premium, the more 
matriculations we observe while at the dropout threshold we observe more dropouts although 
we would expect the opposite.
The variables characterizing the ” degree achievement rate” respectively ability, parents’ 
education and financial resources, are highly significant and point in the right direction, i.e. 
’’good” family background is associated with a higher probability of starting university and 
with a lower dropout probability.
The job offer rate while in university, is positively associated with the employment- 
population ratio of young high-school graduates.
The behavior of labor market variables at the dropout threshold which seem to be at 
odds with the predictions of the theoretical model, suggests the following interpretation: 
according to the survey question about motives for dropping out, a considerable share o f  
students drops out of university because they find their studies too difficult. Discourage­
ment of the misguided is not implemented into our model which assumes youths to have 
perfect knowledge of their ability parameter Obviously, discouragement results from a 
misconceived expectation of the time to degree completion. For misguided students, it does 
not even make sense to use university as a (very cheap but still costly) parking lot once they ! 
realize that their expected time to completion is very large (and maybe even infinity). The ! 
dropout behavior of the misguided students is in some sense independent of the labor market | 
situation at the time of dropout. However, to the extent that labor market variables are seri­
ally correlated, it is likely that the labor market situation at enrolment which induced those 
students to enroll in the first place (in accordance with our theoretical model), is still similar 
to the one that prevails when these misguided students drop out (i.e. doing the opposite 
of parking lot students), leading to a ’’wrongly-signed” impact of labor market variables for 
this group of dropouts at the dropout threshold. The ’’correct” behavior of non-misguided 
students might therefore be superimposed by the misguided students effect.20 Let us stress 
that - once we allow for misconception by students - the discouragement effect is a direct 
consequence of the enrollment behavior of youths who in the absence of job opportunities
20 One possibility to check if this explanation is true, is to introduce interaction terms with type of secondary 
education, so e.g. with a dummy for liceo, the type of secondary school which has presumably by far the 
lowest number of misguided dropouts. This exercise, however is only possible for the 1995 (and the recently 
issued 199S) data, so reducing the variation in local labor market variables because of a shorter panel 
dimension; this part still remains to be done once I have more disaggregated measures that can make up for 
the loss in variation due to a shorter time series.
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(wrongly) consider university education the more promising alternative to unemployment. 
Thus, for these students enrollment and dropout are two sides of the same coin. Our esti­
mates for the dropout threshold are therefore not really at odds with the theoretical model 
but simply complement it and add the missing piece.
To sum up the results for Italy, labor market variables play an important role in explaining 
university enrollment behavior. Lower demand for ("unskilled”) high school graduates as 
well as higher demand for ("skilled”) university graduates increases first-time university 
enrollment. Higher returns to university education induce more students to enroll. At the 
dropout threshold, there are most likely two opposed effects: one subgroup of students 
(rationally) uses university as a parking lot and drops out as soon as they find a suitable 
job. This group is the one that I am able to describe by our theoretical model. The 
second subgroup consists of students with wrong expectations about their ability to obtain 
a university degree. Only after enrolling, they realize their actual ability and then drop out 
independent of current labor market variables.
All of these results together highlight again that the main problem for Italian youth is 
the difficulty of finding the first job.
1.5.2 Germany
For Germany, I first tried to estimate the procedure described in section (1.4.2). Depending 
on the starting values for the parameter vector, the procedure either did not converge at 
all or led to totally unreasonable parameter values (in the range of 104) with huge standard 
errors (in the range of 105). In the case of convergence, different starting values at each case 
led to very different but equally unreasonable estimates. We had to conclude that the data 
are simply not informative for our problem. Put differently, the failure to find a well-defined 
parameter vector maximizing the likelihood function is an indication that the theoretical 
model underlying it does not to describe the German data.
Then I simplified the problem by grouping (1.40) and (1.41) together, i.e. by denoting 
the likelihood contribution of actual dropouts as
*i,AD =  P ( 7* < 7i < 7d) (1.43)
So, instead of differentiating between actual dropouts that axe still in university and 
those that already dropped out, I just use the information that they are actual dropouts and 
therefore must be in the medium ability range. When I estimated this simplified version of 
the model, the problem of non-convergence or convergence to unreasonable parameter values 
remained the same.
j
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Finally, I further simplified the estimation procedure by "assuming away" potential 
dropouts, i.e. I wrote
and thus implicitly assumed all university graduates to be always-takers. Note that by
rate, a key ingredient of our theoretical model! Only now does the maximum likelihood pro­
cedure converge and yield estimates of reasonable size (although with the signs not showing 
any pattern). Yet, what I estimate now is no longer a counterpart of the theoretical model 
and the estimates can basically not be interpreted at all.
But this is exactly what we should expect from a priori reasoning about the German 
case. The theoretical model was developed to yield a description of the Italian dropout 
phenomenon, and the results for Germany therefore do not come as a surprise. In Germany, 
youths do not have problems of integration into the labor market to the extent of Italian 
youths. As 1 pointed out above, a very common career path for German high school graduates 
is to first do an apprenticeship to acquire a vocational certificate which also gives them a 
backup position when going to university. University enrolment in general seems to be much 
more driven by a deep interest in the subject and by long-run perspectives as a university 
graduate than by short- or medium-run fluctuations of labor demand and tvages as is the 
case in Italy.
rates between Italy and Germany. I presented a model that helped to understand the in­
teractions between job search and university education. It highlighted the economic and 
institutional mechanisms inducing many high school graduates to first enroll in university
in university follows from the impossibility of finding a job and can only be explained by 
their misconception of their own ability. Their dropout decision is the consequence of the 
hopelessness to obtain a degree and therefore independent of the labor market situation at 
the time of dropping out. Parking lot students in contrast drop out as soon as they get the 
first suitable job offer but obtain a degree in case they never get a job offer throughout their 
studies. In Germany, only misguided dropouts exist, and there are fewer of them than in
Vi.FD =  P ( 7i >  7d) (1.44)
doing these simplifications, I remove all parts of the likelihood which contain the job arrival
1.6 Conclusion and Policy Implications
The motivation of this paper was to  explain the striking difference in university dropout
and later drop out. The model allowed me to identify two main groups of dropouts in Italy. 
Misguided students are ill-prepared to obtain an academic degree. Their decision to enroll
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Italy. There are no parking lot students in Germany because German high school graduates 
do not have a problem in entering the labor market, anyway.
As for policy conclusions, it seems that the Italian dropout problem has to be approached 
from many different angles at the same time. First, allowing access to university to graduates 
from basically all secondary school tracks contributes to the high number of youths who do 
enroll. This increases the pool of potential dropouts and leads to a high number of misguided 
youths in university who are ill-prepared for academic studies and after some time give up. 
While they are enrolled, they crowd university and deteriorate the study conditions of all 
other students. In contrast, in Germany, not all secondary school tracks lead to university 
and therefore, the pool of youths enrolling in university can be expected to be more able 
on average. In addition, for many over-crowded courses of studies, in Germany access is 
restricted by means of the so-called numerus clausus, the minimum requirement for one’s 
high school grade point average. In Italy, the numerus clausus also exists but is not as 
common as in Germany.
Second, Italy should provide for a vocational training system similar to the German one 
which equips youths with the skills appreciated in the labor market and thereby fills the 
gap between only having a secondary schooling degree and having a university degree. This 
could be the key to improving labor market entry for Italian youth and lowering the number 
of parking lot students.
Third, the system of pre-registration that I mentioned in section (1.2.4) has to be con­
tinued and even extended. Since it was only introduced in 1998, it is too early to see its 
effects on enrollment and dropout behavior, but it is very likely to decrease the number of 
misguided students.
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1.7 Appendix
1.7.1 Farther empirical exercises
I spent several months experimenting w ith different sample selection criteria.and tried many 
different proxies for the labor market variables L. All of them have shortcomings in one or 
the other way and eventually did not improve the results presented above. Yet, I want to 
document the work done because it consumed a major part of the time spent on this thesis 
chapter.
There might be several reasons why the above results are not fully satisfactory. First, 
the fact that we cannot tell apart misguided from parking lot students does not allow us to 
exclude the misguided students from the analysis, thereby leading to the odd results at the 
dropout threshold (see the discussion in the results section above). One possibility to discard 
a great deal of the misguided students from the sample would be to concentrate on students 
coming from liceo, for whom the main motive to enroll and drop out cam be supposed to be 
labor market conditions and not their misconception of their abilitites or their inability to 
succeed in university (also see table 1.2). Unfortunately, the SHIW only contains information 
about the type of high school degree obtained in 1995 and 1998. Restricting the analysis to 
these years, reduced the sample size and time series variation in the labor market variables 
a lot and results thereby did not improve.
Second, and more generally, the empirical proxies as such might be insatisfactory. Employnn 
population rates are stock variables while job arrival rates are flow variables. One alterna­
tive therefore is to use employment-growth, rates. Since the SHIW data are only biennial, 
employment-growth rates are computed over a span of two years. This again did not improve 
the results. To see if the crucial problem lies in the two-year span that might not well enough 
proxy for job opportunities in the year of observation, I tried to compute employment-growth 
rates from another data set, the Indagine sui consumi delle famiglie. This is a yearly data 
set on consumption expenditures provided by ISTAT that also contains information on em­
ployment, education and has geographical indicators for the 5 aggregated areas. The results 
did not improve. Employment-growth rates measure the difference between job creation and 
job destruction. For first-time job-seekers, job creation rates are probably the more relevant 
measure of job opportunities, i.e. job arrival rates.
It was very difficult to find data on job creation rates at all. The only data on job creation 
for the whole of Italy and covering all sectors are provided by the Ministry of Employment 
and Social Affairs. The data are on the number of people starting work mediated by the 
employment agencies. Unfortunately, the data are not split up by educational degrees but
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by 4 broad occupation levels, apprentices (apprendisti) , non-qualified workers (operai non 
qualificati), qualified workers (operai qualificati), and employees ( impiegati). These groups do 
not match with our educational levels of interest. Taking employees for university graduates 
and qualified workers for high school graduates is certainly not the right thing to do and the 
estimates stemming from this exercise are again unsatisfactory.
To sum up, it is pretty difficult to find empirical proxies for job arrival rates of high 
school graduates and university graduates searching for the first job, by gender and for their 
labor market of reference. The empirical results presented in section 1.5 can therefore only 
be seen as a first attempt to bring the theoretical model to the data. Better data is needed 
to get more satisfactory results.
1.7.2 Introducing job destruction into the job search model
In section (1.3.1) I proposed an extension of the model to incorporate job destruction built 
on the modified set of equations (1.1)-(1.3) and (1.11)-(1,12). Subtracting (1.1) from (1.11) 
and (1.2) from (1.12) and rearranging we obtain
(Wu -  Uu) =  
(w3 -  U3) =
(Wu -  b)
r -f- Xu +  <5U 
(ws -  b)
(1.45)
(1.46)
t +  X3 +  6S
which we can substitute back into equations (1.1) and (1.2) to obtain expressions for Uu
and U.:
(1.47)
(1.48)
Again, the marginal individual is indifferent between continuing education and dropping 
out. Thus again, we compare
to
IVU — — [u>u -f- 6U r
( b - w u) 
r +  Au +  6U (1.49)
r +  7i
[i> +  7 = - 2 -[&  +  +  A. {W\  )}]r +  7i r- r +  A* +  JEu,i =
(1.50)
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The equation
1 , e (b — wu) .
-[wu +  6U-+— — £ —] = --------r r  + Att + $uJ r  +  7 t1 (1.51)
defines a threshold value 7d for an individual indifferent between continuing education 
and dropping out. Individuals with 7 i >  7d will continue education while individuals with 
7 i  < 7d will accept the first job offer they get or finish their studies whichever event comes 
first.
We simplify by setting 6 =  0:
w„[l -
6U
-] =
7» (1.52)
r +  Au +  6U r +  7 * r +  As +  63
Applying the implicit function theorem to (1-52) we can see how different parameter 
values affect individuals at the margin of dropping out of education:
I \ UJ‘a) I* A., U).t r A. w« ^  ^
f T A i + i j  r-rA.j-i-ij
The higher wu, the more dropouts there are.
• 7  ¿(ws) =  =  - ¿ i z l h l  <  0
1 '  S '  r . T W S
Higher skilled wages ws are an incentive to continue education.
In contrast to the basic version of the model, here also Au plays a role because of the 
possibility of being fired on an unskilled job and the subsequent option to re-enter university.
Î-:
t* { K)  =  >  0
(~r + -f<i}2 r+A j-t-fi*
The higher the probability of finding a job as an unskilled unemployed, the more 
dropouts there are.
T*(A.) *=
_ -r1^ (r4-ij>rua
- r
( r + - r  “ )• r-r^a-r-àf
_ _  (r+7d)7d(r+6J) ,  p .
~  rT < U
As in the basic case, the higher the probability of finding a job after obtaining a university 
degree, the less dropouts there are.
7 * (* ,)  = <  0
WG&
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The higher the job destruction rate for unskilled jobs, the less dropouts there are. The 
opposite is the case for the job destruction rate of skilled jobs:
>1K|
>0
As in the basic case above, we can compute the expected fraction of dropouts assuming 
that is distributed over the interval (0 ,oo) with distribution function Ffai). Again, the 
expected fraction of dropouts is given by F(7d).
1.7.3 Institutional differences
In this section. I describe the institutional differences in the Italian and German school 
systems. The most remarkable difference is in compulsory schooling age. While in Italy it 
is at age 14. in Germany it is at age 18.21
T h e Italian sch ool system
Italian children first attend scuola matema from the age of 3 to age 6 (equivalent to kinder­
garten). Then, they move on to the scuola elementare for a period of 5 years. After this 
there is the scuola media inferiore, which lasts another 3 years. Its completion marks the 
end of compulsory education. Students who want to continue their education then go to 
the scuola media superiore, which consists of a number of different establishments offering 
different specialkations: these are the liceo classico, the liceo scientifico, liceo linguistico, 
and the istituto tecnico, which take a further five years, the scuola magistrale and istituto 
magistrate, which takes 3 and 4 years, and the istituto professional which takes between 
3 and 5 years. The istituto d ’arte and the liceo artistico are special arts schools preparing 
for the Academy of Arts. All of the tracks with less than 5 years can be ’’upgraded” by 
taking one or two additional years of schooling to complete a full 5 years of upper secondary 
education which is the only prerequisite for entering university.
As for vocational training, there are two different types of possibilities, both of which do 
not yield formal certificates. First, the classical apprendistato (apprenticeship) constitutes 
the start into a blue-collar career. It gives youths a contract of undetermined length. To 
firms, it is rather unattractive because youths immediately have all rights of a blue-collar
21 The regulations differ slightly across German Länder (regions) but in all of them full-time education 
has to be taken until age 16 and part-time education until age 18. Instead of taking part-time education 
between age 16 and 18 one can also take full-time schooling until age 17.
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worker. On the other hand, the contratti di formazione e lavoro are contracts of predeter­
mined length that are subsidized by the state.
For more details see Table 1.6.
The German school system
After 4 years of elementary school, students can choose between three main tracks of sec­
ondary schooling, Hauptschule, Realschule, and Gymnasium, taking 5, 6, and 9 years respec­
tively. Successfully graduating from Gymnasium students obtain the Abitur, the high school 
diploma which gives access to university.
Following Hauptschule or Realschule, but also following Gymnasium, students can start an 
apprenticeship which combines on-the-job training with class-room education. Apart from 
this classical German type of vocational training, there are several specialized vocational 
schools like health care schools but also schools providing training for civil servants.
At the university level, until 1997, short degrees (bachelors) did not exist.
A more detailed picture of the German school system is given in Table 1.7.
1.7.4 Data description
In addition to the Istat data on Italian high school graduates that I extensively discuss in 
section 1.2.4, I use two other data sets: the Bank of Italy Survey of Household Income and 
Wealth (SHIW) and the German Socioeconomic Panel (GSOEP).
The GSOEP da ta
In this paper, I only use the West-German and foreign subsample because of problems 
in comparability of the West- and East-German school systems. Also is the time series 
dimension for these subsamples longer than for the East German and immigrant samples. 
Using the years 1985-1995, the GSOEP data cover approximately the same years as the 
Italian SHIW data.
The GSOEP data also only provide a direct question on parents’ education in one cross- 
section, in 1986. However, we can update this information in later years because we can follow 
individuals over time. This is an advantage over the Italian data. Yet, also in Germany 78% 
of youths aged 16-24 live at home.
Information about income of the rest of the family can be constructed similarly to the 
Italian data.
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The regions used are nearly identical to the West-German states, the so-called Länder. 
Only the smallest Länder, i.e. the cities of Hamburg and Bremen and the Saarland had 
to be merged with neighboring states because their sample sizes would have been to small 
to obtain reliable estimates. I end up using the following 8 regions: Berlin, Schleswig- 
Holstein/Hansestadt Hamburg, Niedersachsen/Hansestadt Bremen, Nordrhein-Westfalen, 
Hessen, Rheinland-Pfalz/Saarland, Baden-Württemberg, Bayern.
The SHIW data
The survey is available from 1977 onwards and has been run on a yearly basis until 1987 
(with the exception of 1985) and every other year since then. Although starting in 1989 a 
small component of rotating panel is introduced in the survey, I ignore this feature of the 
data here.
The SHIW data have several shortcomings that partly determine the selection of the 
sample and also the econometric approach.
First, before 1989, the survey is focusing on income-recipients and therefore only a very 
reduced set of variables is provided for non-income recipients. For instance, the current 
schooling degree held is only known for income recipients, i.e. basically for the working 
population. Since by definition, in the SHIW data one can not declare to be working and 
to be a student at the same time, for persons that declare to be students we do not know 
their current highest degree. So, for example, for a 19-year old, we can not say whether he 
is a student still in high school (holding a junior high school degree) or already in university 
(holding a high school degree). So, in order to be able to select the subsample of youth 
holding a high school degree, we have to  restrict the analysis to the years 1989 and after.
Second, family background variables are not immediately at hand. In the SHIW data, 
a direct question about parents’ education and occupation was only asked in 1995. To be 
able to use data for more years than just the 1995 cross-section, I therefore had to restrict 
the analysis to youths living at home. Doing this, I am able to use information provided by 
the parents themselves. This should not influence the results too much considering that in 
Italy, 88% of youths aged 16-24 are still living at home.
Possible family background variables are parents’ education and occupation and family 
income. Here, I use the maximum of mother’s and father’s years of education and family 
income of the rest of the family, i.e. excluding the youths’ labor income, because non-enrolled 
youths are more likely to earn labor income than enrolled youths, thereby introducing a bias 
in the estimation. I express family income in 1998 Lira and then transform it into Euro. 
Doing the same for Germany makes the results directly comparable.
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As regions I use five aggregated areas North-West, comprising Piemonte, Val d’Aosta, 
Liguria, and Lombardy, North-East, comprising Trentino-Alto Adige, Veneto, Friuli-Venezia 
Giulia, and Emilia Romagna, Center, comprising Tuscany, Umbria, Marche, and Lazio, 
South, comprising Campania, Abruzzo, Molise, Puglia, Basalicata, and Calabria, and Is­
lands, comprising Sardegna and Sicily.
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1.7.5 Tables and Figures
Table 1.1: Some descriptive statistics for the sample of high school graduates
V ariable M ean Std . D ev ,
Age (in years) in 1995 19.73 2.47
Female 0.55 0.50
Live at home in 1998 0.88 0.32
Married in 1998 0.04 0.20
Source: Istat data on high school graduates of the year 1995.
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Table 1.2: Dropout rates by type of secondary school
School type Dropout ra te  N
Istituto professionale 43.57 482
Istituto tecnico 28.36 2447
Liceo 8.06 3944
Other_____________17.04 622
Total 17.72 7495
Notes: fraction of students who enrolled in university in 1995 and dropped out within 3 years. Source: 
Istat data on high school graduates of the year 1995.
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Table 1.3: The probability of dropping out
marginal effect
Istituto professionale 
Istituto tecnico 
Other school 
GPA (senior) high school 
GPA junior high school 
Number of siblings 
Parents’ education 
Age
Number of classes repeated 
Female
0.308
(0.028)**
0.180
(0.012)**
0.0876
(0.021)**
-0.008
(0.000)**
-0.025
(0.005)**
-0.002
(0.005)
-0.007
(0.001)**
0.024
(0.006)**
0.005
(0.008)
-0.008
(0.015)
Number of observations 7495
R2 0.16
Notes: Probit estimation. Dependent variable: l=dropped out of university between 1995 and 1998, 0 if 
not. Reference school type is liceo. Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 57o level; ** significant 
at 1% level. Source: Istat data on high school graduates of the year 1995.
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Table 1.4: Motive for dropping out of university
Motive for dropping out Frequency Percent
Studies too difficult /  didn’t like 475 35.77
To do different studies 62 4.67
Studies didn’t promise professional opportunities 37 2.79
Studying was too costly 67 5.05
Work 343 25.83
Personal Motives 184 13.86
Military Service 106 7.89
Other 54 4.07
Total 1328 lOtT
Source; Istat data on high school graduates of the year 1995.
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Table 1.5:
Results from Maximum Likelihood Estimation
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N e v e r -
ta k e rs
Entry  ( P o t e n t ia l )  
threshold d r o p o u t s
Dropout
threshold
S ta y e rs
Y t  <  r e L  Y e < Y i < Y d
i
Y i  >  Y d
Employment- population 0.654 0.678
ratio HS Grads (0.354) (0.535)
Employment- population -0.319 0.284
ratio Uni Grads (0.245) (0.295)
Returns to University -0.532 0.579
Education (0.414) (0.422)
Sex -0.222 -0.161
(0.087) (0.141)
Parents' education -0.091 -0.091
(0.005) (0.005)
Rest of family income -0.230 -0.230
(0.038) (0.038)
Constant 3.318 3.318
(0.450) (0.450)
Job offer rate
Empi.-pop. Ratio HS Grads 3.065
(1.197)
Sex 0.434
(0.384)
Constant -2.550
(0.726)
N o t e :  M a x i m u m  l i k e l i h o o d  e s t i m a t i o n  o f  t h e  " O r d e r e d  P r o b i t "  m o d e l  d e s c r i b e d  i n  
s e c t i o n  A .  T h e  d e p e n d e n t  v a r i a b l e  i s  a n  i n d i c a t o r  t a k i n g  v a l u e  1  i f  a  y o u t h  i s  
e n r o l l e d  i n  u n i v e r s i t y  a n d  0  i f  h e  i s  n o t  e n r o l l e d .
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Table 1.6: The Italian Educational System
English Term (Diploma in Brackets) Usual Years o f Schooling, 
Training
Italian Term (Diploma in Brackets)
primary school 5 scuola elementare (licenza 
elementare)
lower secondary school (leaving 
certificate)
8 scuola media inferiore (licenza media 
inferiore)
upper secondary specialized school 13 istituto tecnico (diploma istituto 
tecnico)
academic secondary school /  "high 
school" (university entry-level 
leaving certificate)
13 liceo classico, scientifico e linguistico 
(maturità)
upper secondary school for arts 
(requires licenza media inferiore)
+3 or +4 istituto d'arte, liceo artistico (diploma 
artistico)
vocational school (requires licenza 
media inferiore)
+3 istituto professionale (diploma 
professionale)
school for the formation o f  primary 
school teachers
+3 istituto magistrale (diploma 
magistrale)
additional preparation year(s) for 
university following vocational 
school, arts schools or isdtuto 
magistrale [requires diploma o f the 
mentioned schools]
+ 1 or +2 anno integrativo (maturità)
health care school +3 scuola infermieri (diploma 
infermieri)
university (BA, MA) +4 or -i-5 (depending on 
subject)
università (laurea)
doctorate (Ph.D.) +3 dottorato
apprenticeship (NO formal 
certificate!)
one or more years apprendistato (NO formai 
certificate!)
special contract for youth o f 
predetermined length with subsidies 
io the firm
one or more years contratti di formazione e lavoro 
(NO formai certificate!)
civil servant school +1 or +2 •
«RW WWTWJg
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Table 1.7: The German Educational System
English Term (Diploma in Brackets) Usual Years o f Schooling, 
Training
German Term  (Diploma in 
Brackets)
primary school 4 Grundschule
lower secondary school (leaving 9 Hauptschule(Hauptschulabschluss)
certificate) Volksschule (Volksschulabschluss)
intermediate secondary 
school (leaving certificate)
10 Realschule (Mittlere Reife)
comprehensive school /  non- 
streamed secondary school
9-13 Gesamtschule
upper secondary specialized school 
(certificate of aptitude for specialized 
short course higher eduaction)
12 Fachschule (Fachhochschulieife)
academic secondary school /  "high 
school" (university entry-level 
leaving certificate)
13 Gymnasium (Abitur)
pan-time vocational school +2 Berufsschule
technical college /  commercial +2 Fachschule, Handelsschule
college (vocational extension 
certificate)
(Fachschuir ei fc)
specialized vocational school 
[requires lower or intermediate high 
school diploma]
+2 Berufsfachschulc
health care school +2 Schule des Gesundheitswesens
civil servant school + 1.5 Beamtenausbildung
polytechnical +3 FH  Ingenieurschule
university (BA, MA, PhD) +5 Universität, Hochschule (Diplom, 
Magister, Doktor)
comprehensive university, 
specialized college
+5 Gesamthochschule
apprenticeship, agricultural + 1.5 gewerbliche, landwirtschaftliche
apprenticeship Lehre
trade/commerce apprenticeship + 1.5 kaufmännische Lehre
- Hmmir
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Figure 1.1: enrolment of Italian youth (20-24 year old)
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Figure 1.5: Historic Dropout Rates
Note: the figure displays the fraction of students enrolling in university in the given 
period that drop out without obtaining a degree.
Source: Indagine longitudinale sulle famiglie italiane (ILFI), own calculations.
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Chapter 2
Returns to Education in Germany
(written with Frank Siebem-Thomas)
2.1 Introduction
The presence of heterogeneity in returns to schooling seems by now well established. Building 
on Gary Becker’s (1967) model of optimal schooling according to which individuals choose 
their optimal schooling level by equating marginal benefits from continuing in education with 
the related marginal costs, recent theoretical contributions by inter alia Card (1995a,1995b) 
and Lang (1993) argue that individuals with different unobservable characteristics like ability, 
liquidity constraints or discount rates axe likely to incur different marginal costs and benefits 
of further education and hence self-select into specific schooling levels. Such differences in 
the marginal costs and benefits of schooling imply different returns to schooling at different 
optimal schooling levels.
This in turn suggests the estimation of the returns to schooling on the basis of adequate 
instrumental variables and an interpretation of these estimates as local average treatment 
effects (LATE) along the lines of Angrist, Imbens and Rubin (1996): The estimated returns 
apply only to those individuals who are affected by the underlying instrument, i.e. those 
who only continue in school one more year because of their being induced to it by the 
instrument; in the language of the evaluation literature, the instrument is interpreted as an 
assignment to treatment, with one more year of schooling being interpreted as treatment. 
Moreover, different instruments will naturally affect different subgroups and hence lead to 
varying estimates of the returns to schooling.1
^ o r  authorative overviews of the recent literature on the identification and estimation of causal effects
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Several empirical studies on the returns to schooling in the US seem to corroborate the 
LATE interpretation of instrumental variables estimates.* 2 Card (1995b) and Kling (2000) 
e.g. use an indicator of the presence of a college in the county of residence at schooling age 
as instrument. They argue that this ’’college proximity” might allow individuals from low 
income (probably even liquidity constrained) families to attend college who otherwise (i.e. 
if they would have had to move to another county in order to go to college) would not have 
done so.3
For Germany, Ichino and Winter-Ebmer (1999, 2G00)4 are the only authors we know of 
that provide LATE estimates of the returns to schooling.5 IWE (1999) especially contrast 
estimates obtained on the basis of two different instruments: first, parental educational 
background, and second, an indicator of the father’s serving in the military during World 
War II. Since parental education as assignment mechanism is likely to affect less able children 
from well-off families (IWE call them the ’’stupid rich”) the corresponding IV estimate is 
interpreted as a lower bound of the returns to schooling in Germany. On the other hand, 
’’childhood during war” and particularly ’’father in war” are considered an extreme form 
of liquidity constraints that might hinder highly talented children from poor families (the 
’’smart poor”) to continue schooling. For this reason, the authors interpret the IV estimate 
based on the ’’war instrument” as an upper bound of the returns to schooling in Germany.
In this paper, we extend the IWE (I999)-study in several ways: First, we replicate the 
Card- and Kling-studies for Germany, making use of an instrument similar to Card’s ’’college 
proximity”. Second, we allow for a variable treatment intensity and try to characterize both 
the affected subgroups as well as the response functions, and third, we compare results for 
1985 with those for 1995, thus testing indirectly for changes in the returns to schooling, in 
the instrument effectiveness, and in the response functions over time.
The results obtained on the basis of GSOEP data suggest that similar to the US re­
sults by Card and Kling, IV estimates of the returns to schooling are substantially higher
in economics cf. Angrist and Krueger (1999) and Card (1999).
2Further empirical studies on the returns to schooling in a LATE framework are e.g. Angrist (1990), 
Angrist and Krueger (1991), Angrist and Imbens (1995), and Kane and Rouse (1993).
3Cf. overview of IVE results by Card (1999).
4 IWE (1999) draws on IWE (2000) where in addition to the instrument ’father in war’ an indicator of 
the individual’s having been in the age group 9-15 during the Second World War is used as an instrument. 
The latter paper is more specifically concerned with the long-run educational cost of World War II, while 
the first paper is more methodological and aims at providing evidence for heterogeneity in the returns to 
schooling.
5Lauer and Steiner (2000) do actually seem to follow a similar approach but they refrain from interpreting 
their estimates as local average treatment effects.
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than corresponding OLS estimates. We show that individuals from disadvantaged family 
backgrounds profit most from a better schooling infrastructure prevalent in urban areas.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: in the next section we present Becker’s 
model of optimal schooling. In section 3, we present some basic evidence on the relationship 
between educational attainment and college proximity using regional and GSOEP data. In 
section 4, we present the GSOEP data and describe our sample. Section 5 discusses the use 
of IV estimation in our context and presents the instruments used in the empirical analysis. 
There, we also summarize the results of this analysis and discuss their interpretation. Section 
6 concludes.
2.2 Theoretical considerations
In this section we shortly recall Becker’s (1964) model of endogenous schooling in the ver­
sion laid out by Card (1995b). It provides both the rationale for heterogeneous returns to 
schooling and the basis for the LATE interpretation of our results.
An individual maximizes
U(y,S) =logy-<t>(S) (2.1)
where y is average earnings per year, 5  is years of schooling and <£(•) is the cost of 
schooling. An individual’s opportunities are represented by y =  <?(£).6 The first order 
condition of the optimization problem is
Now, assume for simplicity that
9'(S)
9{S)
=  m
9'{S)
9{S)
Pi(S) = b t -  fciS (fci > 0)
and
(2 .2)
(2.3)
<S>'{S) = 6i(S) =  rt +  k2S (fc2 >  0) (2.4)
6There is considerable discussion in the literature as to which variable best describes the theoretical 
concept of human capital. Griliches (1977) points out that years of schooling is rather one of the inputs of 
the human capital production process than its outcome. To the extent that output measures are unavailable, 
years of schooling as a proxy for human capital is the best variable we can get to describe what is valued in 
the labor market.
i
sa sa a £ 0
1' U4
The optimal schooling level is then given by 5 “ =  (6j — rx)/k, where k — k\ +  k2. 
Integrating out (2.3) yields
54 CHAPTER 2. RETURNS TO EDUCATION IN GERMANY
logy =  biS — O.bkiS2 (2.5)
Equations (2.3) and (2.4) clearly state the reason for heterogeneous returns to schooling: 
Individuals are likely to differ in either marginal costs r* or marginal benefits hi and are 
therefore likely to choose different optimal schooling levels as shown in figure 2.1.
This is exactly what is exploited by the LATE-IV approach. A given instrument will affect 
different margins, i.e. different subpopulations at different schooling levels. As explained in 
detail in Angrist and Imbens (1995) we can hope to estimate only the average marginal 
return to schooling for a well-defined subgroup which is affected by the instrument. In the 
presence of heterogeneity, the notion of a unique return to schooling is hence nonsensical. In 
section 2.5.2 we are going to explain this in further detail.
We actually estimate the following system of equations:
y =  X/3 + S~f +  e (2.6)
S =  XS + Zct +  'q (2.7)
where Z is an instrument or set of instruments. For the LATE interpretation of IV to apply 
to the estimate of 7  in (2.6), the conditions in Imbens and Angrist (1994) have to apply.7 
This approach thus makes a good out of the two main problems faced in a simple OLS 
regression of (2.6): the problem of self-selection into schooling and heterogeneity in returns 
to schooling. The main problem in empirical applications is, of course, to find an adequate 
instrument as an exogenous source of variation in education choices.
2.3 Educational outcomes and returns to schooling in 
Germany
l
In this section, we present descriptive evidence based on regional data for some recent years j 
(1996-1998).8 We collected data about school completion rates and school infrastructure as
7 Further assumptions implicit in equations (2.6) and (2.7) are log-linearity of earnings in schooling and I
the absence of degree effects (sheepskin effects). See Card (1999) for empirical evidence on the absence of i 
sheepskin effects in the US. 1
8 The data had to be obtained from the single regional statistical offices (Statistische Landes amt er) because j
to our knowledge no consistent educational data base exists at the national level. I
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well as some information about the state of the labor market at the level of counties (Kreise). 
These data show, in particular, a huge variation in completion rates across counties as well 
as a positive correlation between completion rates and schooling infrastructure.
2.3.1 Some background information using regional data
High school completion rates (Abitur) in Germany range from roughly 8% (in the Südwestp­
falz) to 52% (in Darmstadt) of all school leavers across counties and hence show astonishingly 
strong regional variation. To see whether there is any systematic relationship between these 
high school completion rates on the one side and the schooling infrastructure on the other 
side, we plotted the percentage of school leavers having Abitur against the log of the num­
ber of high schools per square kilometer as a measure of schooling infrastructure (see figure 
2.2). The availability of high schools is in fact seen to be highly correlated with high school 
completion rates.9
A higher average distance to the nearest high school is likely to increase the costs of 
education. Apart from the (time) opportunity costs of having to travel more, direct costs 
involve additional transport costs. All other costs do a priori not differ by distance to 
school. They might differ, however, across the various German regions (Länder) which 
are solely responsible for educational matters. Although there are generally no school fees 
neither for primary and secondary schools nor for universities, regulations regarding the 
public provision of books and other material used by students or subsidies for book purchases 
to low income families as well as regarding transportation subsidies for students do actually 
differ significantly across the various Länder. In many regions subsidies to either transport 
or book purchase are limited to students up to compulsory school age (i.e. 18 years old) or 
some other specific age (15 or 16 years old) and have to be borne fully by older students. 
Last but not least, the schooling years necessary for high school completion amount to 13 
years in the West German Länder and Brandenburg as opposed to only 12 years in the 
remaining new German Lander. At university, the only fee to pay is for social security and 
health contributions.10
To sum up, using regional data we find lower high school completion rates in rural, 
less densely populated regions with a poorer schooling infrastructure. In addition, using 
microdata (GSOEP) we find lower high school completion rates for individuals who grew up
9 Of course, this is not necessarily a causal relationship driven by the supply of high schools. It could also 
be that lower demand for higher education causes less supply by the state.
10In the later regressions, we try to capture differences in regulations across states by including a set of 
state dummies.
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in rural as opposed to urban areas (see table 2.1).11
Average years of schooling by agglomeration show a similar pattern as can be seen from 
table 2.2.
Do these differences tell us something about regional variations in the quality of schools 
and/or high school degrees (as often suggested in the political debate) or are they indicative 
of regionally varying opportunity costs related to longer schooling?
Our conjecture is that higher costs of education in regions with ’poor schooling infrastruc­
ture’ reduce private investments in schooling, at least among children from relatively low- 
income/high discount rate families. This is also suggested by existing empirical studies on the 
returns to schooling based on instrumental variable estimation (Card (1995b), Kling (2000)). 
Card finds that the IV estimates of the earnings gain per year of additional schooling (10- 
14%) axe substantially above the earnings gains estimated by a conventional OLS procedure 
(7.3%). Kling (2000), using Card’s data, confirms Card’s results and further characterizes 
the group of students affected by differences in place of childhood.
2.3.2 Previous studies
Previous results for Germany are based on simple OLS regressions of earnings on schooling. 
Using years 1984 and 1985 of the German Socioeconomic Panel (GSOEP), Wagner and 
Lorenz (1989) estimate returns to schooling of 6.5%. In a further study Lorenz and Wagner 
(1993) give a range of 6.2-7,0% based on the Luxemburg Income Study (LIS 1981) and of 
4.0-4.9% using data of the International Social Survey Program (ISSP 1987).
To our knowledge, the only studies using IV estimation are Ichino and Winter-Ebmer 
(1999, 2000) and Lauer and Steiner (2000). The former authors exploit three different 
instruments: an indicator of father’s education, an indicator of whether an individual was 
10 years old during World War II and an indicator of whether their father was in war in 
this period. Using data from the GSOEP (1986), they give a lower bound of 4 .8% and an 
upper bound of 14% for the return to schooling for those subpopulations that are affected 
by the respective instruments. The latter authors not only estimate the returns to schooling 
using various estimation methods but also employ IV estimators on the basis of a whole long 
list of different instruments. They are above all interested in an analysis of the robustness 
of the estimated returns to schooling with respect to  the various estimation methods and *
“ Using regional data and defining agglomerations by quartiles of population density - which obviously do 
not coincide with the GSOEP classification - we observe a similar pattern. Going from the most densely to 
the least densely populated quartile, high schol completion rates in 1997 are 30.92, 23.07, 18.86, and 19.40 I 
respectively.
i
do not provide a LATE interpretation of the obtained IV estimation results. Moreover, the 
authors conclude that there is no statistical evidence for heterogenous returns to schooling 
with respect to unobservable characteristics.
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2.4 Data description and sample selection
We use the German Socioeconomic Panel because it is the richest German micro data set to 
study our question of interest. It contains information on education, income, personal and 
job characteristics, family background, and biography information that we exploit in the IV
estimation below.
We only keep the full-time employed in 1985 or 1995 who have no missing information on 
our variables of interest, in particular labor income and schooling. In tables 2.3, 2.4, and 2.5, 
we show descriptive statistics for the dependent variables, for schooling variables, and for 
exogenous variables. As for schooling variables, we present both average years of schooling 
along with degree information.
2.5 IV Estimation of the Returns to Education
2.5.1 Choice of instrument
Previous studies have used a broad range of instruments to establish causality in the returns 
to schooling (see Card, 1999) and the references therein). The choice of an instrument has 
several important aspects. First, econometrically speaking the instrument should fulfill the 
exclusion restriction, i.e. have an effect on earnings only via the schooling channel but no 
direct effect on earnings. Second, heterogeneity in marginal costs and benefits of schooling 
and therefore the absence of a unique return to schooling for the population as a whole can 
be exploited by choosing an instrument which describes a quasi-experiment of important 
policy interest. So, IV estimation is not just the solution to the econometric problem of 
possibly biased OLS estimates but allows to analyze interesting policy questions. On the 
basis of these two considerations, we choose our instrument ’place of childhood’ which is 
similar to Card’s (1995b) college proximity indicator. It has not yet been used for German 
data and allows us to address the question as to who profits how from differences in schooling 
infrastructure across different places of childhood.
The question on place of childhood in the GSOEP questionnaire is expressed as follows:
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,}Did you spend the major portion of your childhood up to age 15 in a) a city, b) a big 
town, c) a small town, or d) in the countryside ?”
In the sequel, we axe going to use three different binary indicators based on this question: 
’spent childhood in a city’(pci), ’spent childhood in a city or big town’ (pc2), and ’spent 
childhood in an urban area’ (pc3), i.e. in a city, or in a small or big town. Table 2.6 show's 
the percentage of the sample with given instrument status.
2.5.2 W hich Effect Can We Identify? The variable treatment ap­
proach to the estimation of returns to schooling
The IV estimate of the returns to schooling based on ’place of childhood’ as an instrument 
identifies a causal effect for well-defined subpopulations and schooling levels. The implied 
natural experiment uses place of childhood as assignment to treatment (Z), the schooling 
level as treatment (S ), and log(monthly earnings) as outcome (V).
The model we estimate is an extension of Rubin’s Causal Model (RCM) to variable 
treatment intensity. Assume that each individual would earn Yj if he or she had j  years of 
schooling for j  =  0 , 1,2,. . . ,  J. The objective is to uncover information about the distribution 
of Yj — Y j-i , which is the causal effect of the jth  year of schooling. This will help us 
understand under which conditions and for which subpopulation of interest 7  can be given a 
causal interpretation. In general, estimates of 7  in equation (2.6) have a causal interpretation 
only if they have probability limit equal to a weighted average of E[Yj — >}_]] for all j  in 
the subpopulation of interest.
We can define potential schooling levels and potential outcomes for all potential values 
of the instrument (e.g. grown up in the countryside, in a small town, in a town, in a big 
city) for each individual. We define S z t{0 ,1,2,... ,  J} to be the number of years of schooling 
completed by a student conditional on the values of the instrument. Let’s initially assume 
that Z  is coded to take on only two values, 1 and 0, indicating that the place of childhood 
was either in an urban area or in the countryside. S\ then denotes the years of schooling 
that would be obtained by an individual growing up in an urban area, and S0 is the years 
of schooling of the same individual if he or she grew up in the countryside. In the data, 
for each individual we observe the triple (Z,S, V), where Z denotes the place of childhood, 
S =  Sz =  Z * S\ +  (1 — Z) * So is years of completed schooling, and Y = Y$ is earnings.12
12Note that, for simplification, we do not use distinct notation for random variables and observations. 
More correctly, we should denote observations as {Z0b9,S obsi io6s), where Z oba denotes the observed place of 
childhood, Sobs =  S z obt — Zobs — Z0ba) * So is observed years of completed schooling, and Y^s =  Ysob,
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The main identifying assumption is the following 
A ssum ption  1 (Independence)
The random variables So,Si,Yo,Yi,...,Yj are jointly independent of Z.
In our case this requires that place of childhood has no effect on earnings other than 
through its effect on schooling. This implies the existence of unit-level causal effects. To 
identify a meaningful average treatment effect, the literature typically assumes a constant 
unit treatment effect, Y^ — =  a, for all schooling levels j  and all individuals i. Angrist
and Imbens (1995), however, impose a nonparametric restriction on the process determining 
S  as a function of Z  instead of restricting treatment effect heterogeneity. They impose the 
following
A ssum ption  2 (Monotonicity)
With probability 1, either Si — Sq > 0 or Si — So <  0 for each person.
Angrist and Imbens (1995) further show that for multivalued treatments (J >  1), as­
sumption 2 has the testable implication that the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of 
S  given Z =  1 and the CDF of S  given Z — 0 should not cross.
From the above assumptions follows the main result in the framework of multivalued
treatments:
T heorem  1 Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold and that Pr(*S'i >  j  > So) >  0 for at 
least one j .  Then
(2.8)
where
Pr(-Si > j  > S0)
(2.9)
3 £/=iPr(S, > i > S 0)
denotes weights and where the response function is defined as
K ; ) 3 E r c - ï i - i | S i > j > S b ] (2.10)
is observed earnings as a function of observed schooling.
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This implies that 0 < wj <  1 and X)/=i uj — 1» s0 that 7  is a weighted average of per-unit 
average causal effects along the length of an appropriately defined causal response function. 
Angrist and Imbens (1995) refer to the parameter 7  as the average causal response (ACR).
The ACR weights Wj are proportional to the number of people who, because of the 
instrument, change their treatment from less than j  units to j  or more units. The response 
function r(j)  gives the average difference in the outcome for those who change their treatment 
from less than j  units to j  or more units. In the case of further covariates, the analysis is 
slightly more complicated and requires weighting by the conditional variance of Z.
In our example, IV generates an estimate of the average causal effect among individuals 
with different marginal benefits from schooling: First, different subgroups are affected by 
different instruments. Second, individuals in these subgroups are affected by the respective 
instrument in different ways. And third, the instrument may induce changes of behavior at 
different levels of schooling.
In the empirical part, we present both the weighting function and the response function 
for the given choice of instrument and thereby try to characterize the affected subgroups and 
schooling levels.
2.5.3 IV Estimation Results
We started by estimating an OLS regression of earnings on years of schooling controlling for 
sex, experience and tenure on the job polynomials, yielding estimates in the usual range of 
6.7% and 6 .6% for 1985 and 1995 respectively.
For the reasons given above, these estimates are probably not amenable to an interpreta­
tion as the causal effect of schooling on earnings. We therefore performed an IV estimation 
of the returns to education on the basis of the instruments suggested above. The instru­
mental variables estimates of the returns to  schooling on the basis of the chosen instrument 
have been computed using the two-stage least squares procedure: in the first stage, the 
years o f schooling are regressed on the whole list of exogenous variables augmented by the 
respective instrumental variable using a simple linear probability model; in the second stage, 
the predicted value of the dependent variable from the first stage regression is then used as 
additional regressor in the outcome equation instead of the schooling years itself. Table 2.7 
contains the IV estimation results for the various chosen instrumental variables. Further, 
first-stage ¿-statistics and partial R2 measures are reported as a diagnostic tool following the 
suggestions of Bound et al. (1995) and Staiger and Stock (1997). In all cases, the instrument 
quality seems reasonable as suggested by these measures.
The returns estimated using either of these instruments are considerably higher than the
VWmmI» tfl flnìwwi
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OLS estimates. In 1985, the point estimates are 12.6%, 12.5% and 13.3% for the binary 
instruments ’spent childhood in a city’, ’spent childhood in a city or big town’, and ’spent 
childhood in an urban area’. A similar picture arises in the 1995 data. Throughout, the 
TV estimates are nearly double the size of the OLS estimates. In the light of the LATE 
framework, these results can be interpreted as the returns to education for those who acquired 
more education because they are living in an area with a good schooling infrastructure.
2.5.4 Internal validity of the instruments
To check the internal validity of the instrument for identification of the LATE parameter, we 
have to check the assumptions given in Angrist, Imbens and Rubin (1996).13 Not all of these 
assumptions are in general rigorously testable. We can only argue and give corroborating 
evidence as we do in the sequel.
We can be quite confident that the SUTVA assumption is satisfied in our sample. It 
requires potential earnings to be unrelated to the amount of schooling taken by other indi­
viduals in the sample. This assumption is more likely to be violated in clustered samples.
Strongly ignorable assignment to treatment requires that after controlling for observable 
characteristics, unobservables like ability should be randomly distributed across different 
places of childhood. This assumption could be violated if parents endogenously choose to live 
in an urban area because of better schooling infrastructure. Most of this potential selection 
into places of living is probably controlled for by observables. In any case, geographical 
mobility in Germany is quite low by international standards. While Germany has 16 states 
and about 80 million inhabitants, the US have 51 states and about 250 million inhabitants, so 
average population per state is relatively similar, the US states being bigger in size, however. 
While in the US, 3% of the population move across state borders every year, in Germany only 
1% of the population move across state borders.14 Not only are mobility rates low anyway,
13 AIR (1996) prove that the instrumental variables estimate of 6  in the heterogenous tr e a tm e n t  effect 
model has a c a u s a l  interpretation as lo ca l a v e ra g e  tr e a tm e n t  e ffe c t  under the following assumptions:
(1) Potential o u tc o m e s  for each individual i  are unrelated to the t r e a tm e n t  status of other individuals. 
( s ta b le  u n i t  t r e a tm e n t  v a lu e  a s s u m p tio n  ( S U T V A ) )
(2) Conditional on observables, the a s s ig n m e n t  to  tr e a tm e n t  is random, ( s t r o n g ly  ig n o ra b le  a s s ig n m e n t  to  
t r e a tm e n t )
(3) The t r e a tm e n t  probability is a nontrivial and monotonous function of the instrument, i.e. 
E  [T*ti — £>to] > 0. ( s t r o n g  m o n o to n ic i t y )
(4) The (unit-level) potential o u tc o m e  variables depend on the assignment status Zi only through the 
t r e a tm e n t  status Di, i.e. (Vio, Va) -h %% |£*. ( e x c lu s io n  r e s t r i c t io n s )
14 Data come from the US Census Bureau website
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but the reasons for moving are very unlikely to be related to schooling infrastructure as well. 
The GSOEP data contain a question on reasons for move. In 1997, respondents can give a 
maximum of three out of a list of 15 possible reasons. Overall, 8 .6% of the movers give "other 
family reasons” (i.e. not divorce, marriage and leaving parent’s home) as reason for move. 
If at all, families that move to give their kids access to a better schooling infrastructure 
might show up in this group. For families with kids under age 18 (i.e. those families for 
whom schooling infrastructure might play a roll), the percentage moving for ”other family 
reasons” is even lower yet (5.2%), thus making "better schooling infrastructure” an even 
more unlikely reason for moving. We conclude that our estimates are very unlikely to suffer 
from violation of the strongly ignorable assignment to treatment assumption.
Strong monotonicity compares again two counterfactual situations: an individual growing 
up in a city (i.e. in region with good schooling infrastructure) takes at least as much schooling 
as if he had grown up in the countryside (i.e, in a region with a w'orse infrastructure). This 
assumption rules out defiers, i.e. individuals w'ho, if growing up in a city, take less schooling 
than if growing up in the countryside. In theory', there might be individuals wrho take less 
schooling growing up in an urban area due to e.g. drugs and delinquency, but growing up 
in a rural area would have obtained more schooling. In a similar w'ay, labor demand in 
cities might be higher and therefore students might have more outside options in a city as 
compared to an urban area and for some individuals these outside options might lead to a 
lower schooling level. While we cannot really rule out that there are some cases like this, 
for the reliability and interpretability of our estimates it is important that the fraction of 
defiers is nevertheless very small. One testable implication of strong monotonicity is that 
the cumulative density functions of schooling by instrument status do not cross. As we will 
showr, this holds in our data and makes us confident that violation of the strong monotonicity 
assumption is not a serious issue here.
The exclusion restriction wrould be violated if there existed a direct effect of the suggested 
instrument on earnings, e.g. in the form of an ’urban wage premium’. We are in the 
fortunate situation to have some information about the current place of living. The GSOEP 
data contain both current state (Bundesland) of residence as well as the so-called Boustedt 
regions.15 We find that by including these further controls, in 1985 the estimated returns to 
schooling do not change and in 1995 they even go slightly up. When controlling for state
(http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/migTation/tab-a-l.txt) and from the website of the German 
National Statistical Office
(http://www.statistik-bund.de/jahrbuch/jahrtabo.htm).
15Boustedt (1970) classifies urban regions into seven categories, assigns the neighbouring communities of 
an urban center to four different sub-categories from ’’rural” to ’’urban center”.
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dummies, the coefficients on the Boustedt dummies are found to be statistically insignificant. 
We might therefore conclude that there is no violation of the exclusion restriction through 
an urban wage premium.
Another reason why the exclusion restriction might be violated is that school quality 
might vary by place of childhood. In this case, controlling for characteristics of the current 
place of living is not sufficient because people might have moved and the decision to take 
further schooling depended on their place of childhood and not on their current place of 
living. To see if this is a valid objection, we follow an idea similar to Card (1995b) and 
Kling (2000). They propose to define family background quartiles across which the returns 
to schooling will vary. In order to test whether college proximity is a legitimate instrument, 
they use the interaction of college proximity with an indicator for low parental background 
as an instrument and control for the main effect of college proximity. Translated to our 
setup, the idea is that our instrument is unlikely to affect individuals from higher family 
background quartiles because they have the necessary support by their family to pursue 
further education even if the respective schools are not nearby. So, using the instrument as 
such or using the instrument interacted with an indicator of low family background is the 
same, and gives us one more degree of freedom, namely allows us to control for the main 
effect of the ’place of childhood’ indicator. We will further discuss the construction of the 
family background quartiles in the following section. There, we also use them to characterise 
the subgroup of compilers, so they serve a double purpose.
Let us shortly summarize the results of the estimation using the interacted instruments. 
We find that indeed the main effect of ’growing up in an urban area’ is small in size and 
statistically insignificant.16 The lower panel of table 2.7 shows that the point estimates 
are lower than the ones where we do not control for the main effect of ’growing up in an 
urban area’, but that they are still considerably higher than the OLS estimates. On the 
basis of this evidence in favor of both the absence of urban wage premia and the validity 
of the exclusion restriction, we conclude that the returns to education for the subgroups 
of compliers, i.e. those individuals who only acquire more schooling when enjoying a good 
schooling infrastructure, are significantly and substantially higher than the simple OLS es­
timates. In the following section, we turn to the characterization of the subgroups affected 
by our instrument.
16The coefficients on the main effect pci is 0.012 with a standard error of 0-019 in 1985, and 0.011 with a 
s.e. of 0.020 in 1995.
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2.5.5 External validity of the instruments
If we want to generalize our estimates to some larger populations (’’external to the sample”), 
we have to characterize as closely as possible the subgroups affected by our instrument and 
the size of the effect on them. We suggested above that the effect of schooling infrastructure 
is more important for children from less advantaged family backgrounds. We follow Card 
and Kling in defining family background quartiles in the following ivay: First, we perform 
a regression of years of schooling on the subgroup of people who spent their childhood in a 
rural area. Then, based on the parameter estimates obtained, we predict - for all individuals 
- their ’counterfactual schooling level if they had grown up in a rural area’ and split the 
sample into four quartiles, from the lowest (fbql) to highest (fbq4).
Table 2.8 presents some summary statistics on average years of schooling by instrument 
status and family background quartile for the years 1985 and 1995. Apart from the fact that 
average years of schooling are higher for those who grew up in urban areas, the table clearly 
shows that for those who have a higher predicted (counterfactual) schooling level, also actual 
schooling attainment is higher.
Table 2.9 further shows the distribution of family background and individual variables 
across these ’counterfactual schooling quartiles’.17 There is no single individual in the lowest 
three family background quartiles whose father has a university degree. Conversely, there 
is virtually no individual in the twfo highest background quartiles who has a father without 
a schooling degree. We also see that a higher percentage of those in the upper family 
background quartiles did actually grow up in a city.
The IV estimate of the returns to schooling can be interpreted as a weighted average of 
the potentially differing treatment effects across the four background quartiles, 79, with the 
weight given to each quartile q by the product of the proportion of the population in that 
subgroup (wq) and the impact on schooling for that subgroup (A£g). This allows us to write
_ _  ^?A5979
AS
q = l
We give the weights wq in table 2.10.
Table 2.11 shows the differences in schooling levels by instrument status for the population 
as a w'hole (AS).
Figures 2.3 and 2.4 further split up the information of table 2.10 by family background 
quartiles for 1985 and 1995 respectively. In 1985, the actual average education difference by
17It is interesting to  note that in the lowest background quartile, none of individuals report that either 
their father or mother graduated from high school.
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instrumental status is much larger for the two lower background quartiles, supporting the 
suggestion of section 5.3 that instead of our indicator for ’growing up in an urban area’ we 
can equally well use this indicator interacted with poor family background. This allows us 
to use the main effect of ’growing up in an urban area’ in the estimation and thereby control 
for there being an urban wage premium. We already reported the results of this exercise in 
the previous subsection.
2.5.6 Characterizing the response function
The response function can be estimated from the cumulative distribution functions (CDF) 
of schooling at different values of the instrument. The difference in the CDFs is equivalent 
to the fraction of the population who received at least one more year of schooling due to the 
instrument. Figure 2.5 shows the difference in the CDFs for the 1985 sample using p c i as 
an instrument.18 It indicates that schooling infrastructure has its largest effect at 11 years 
of schooling. More specifically we interpret the estimates to indicate that around 10 percent 
of individuals with similar demographics are induced to obtain more years of schooling due 
to better schooling infrastructure.
It is even more interesting to break down the response function by background quartiles. 
Figure 2.6 shows that the response function of the two lower background quartiles peaks at 
10 years of schooling while the response of the two upper quartiles is concentrated among 
those with 13 or more years of schooling. Furthermore, the fraction of ’compliers’ in the two 
upper quartiles is overall much lower, again showing that the instrument affects mainly the 
two lowrer family background quartiles.
From a policy point of view, this result suggests that the provision of schools beyond 10th 
grade, i.e. basically the provision of (senior) high schools (Gymnasien), can considerably 
increase the fraction of youths from disadvantaged backgrounds who obtain more schooling.
For 1995, the picture is slightly different. First, figure 2.7 suggests that for this later co­
hort, schooling infrastructure increased educational attainment at a later stage in educational 
careers.
Overall, in 1995 the response function is flatter and takes on lower values than in 1985. 
Second, breaking down by background quartiles, we find that the point of maximum response 
has moved to the right for all subgroups. Also has the fraction of the population in all 
subgroups who respond to our instrument decreased (see figure 2.8)
The fact that figures 2.5 and 2.7 display only non-negative values is equivalent to say-
18 Figures based on the instruments pc2 and pc3 show a similar pattern and are therefore not shown here.
MMUUIIIIIIIIIIIIIliril II I I
66 CHAPTER 2. RETURNS TO EDUCATION IN GERMANY
ing that the CDFs for Z — 1 and Z =  0 don’t cross, a finding that supports the strong 
monotonicity assumption laid out in section 2.5.4.
To sum up, there seems to be a decreasing effect of our instrument on lower schooling 
levels and/or an increasing effect of the instrument on higher schooling levels. This also 
explains why returns to education seem to have decreased between 1985 and 1995.
2.6 Summary and conclusions
This study corroborates the general finding of other studies based on IV estimation that OLS 
estimates are downward biased. It confirms the empirical evidence that different instruments 
lead to  different estimates of the schooling coefficient, underlining the fact that returns 
to schooling are heterogenous. Our estimates remain within the bounds given by IWE 
(1999). We find that individuals from ’poor family background’ respond most strongly 
to the instrument ’place of childhood’. Their response is further most pronounced at low 
schooling levels whereas the response of individuals with ’rich family background’ is most 
pronounced at higher schooling levels. Finally, this approach allows us to detect changes in 
the response function over time.
The temporal variation of returns to schooling operates through two different channels. 
First, temporal variation in the covariate weights leads to a reweighting of the returns for 
different subgroups. We conjecture that there is a decreasing fraction of compilers from 
a poor family background and/or an increasing fraction of compilers from a rich family 
background. Second, temporal variation of returns to schooling is also due to temporal 
variation in the response functions. There seems to be a decreasing effect of our instrument 
on lower schooling levels and/or an increasing effect of instrument on higher schooling levels.
The finding that educational attainment crucially depends on the provision of post- 
compulsory schooling in proximity to the place of living, has important policy implications. 
Consider the case of a regional government that has decided to devote a certain amount of 
money to the improvement of upper secondary schooling infrastructure.19 It then faces the 
decision where to build the school, in an urban area or in a rural area, or similarly whether 
to build one big school in a city or some smaller schools in the countryside. If the per 
student cost of providing further places at school is constant independent of where schools 
are built, our results clearly indicate that students living in areas with a less favourable
19We do not address the cost-benefit issue here, i.e. we do not ask whether for the region as a  whole 
investing in schooling infrastructure is beneficial. In contrast, we take an individual-level perspective and 
take the provision of funds by the government as given in this thought experiment.
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schooling infrastructure would probably benefit most from such an investment because of 
their above average marginal returns to education. To the extent that schooling infrastruc­
ture is correlated with the degree of urbanisation, providing a better schooling infrastructure 
especially in rural areas could thus considerably increase the incentives for individuals from 
disadvantaged family background to acquire more education and thus improve their long-run 
prospects in the labor market.
It is important to note, though, that the policy implication might be quite different for 
the case in which the federal government increases schooling infrastructure in the country 
as a whole. In this case there might be general equilibrium effects that decrease the return 
to education in the long run due to an overall higher supply of better-educated individuals 
(see Heckman et al., 1999). The policy implications of this paper do therefore refer to the 
optimal allocation of schools but not necessarily to the optimal overall spending on schooling 
infrastructure.
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2.7 Appendix
Table 2.1: High school completion rates by agglomeration
agglomeration
GSOEP
1985
GSOEP
1995
city 18.49 25.00
big town 15.76 20.12
small town 10.94 18.70
in the countryside 8.58 12.97
Table 2.2: Years of schooling by agglomeration
GSOEP GSOEP
agglomeration 1985 1995
city 12.01 12.42
big town 12.00 12.37
small town 11.28 11.97
in the countryside 11.10 11.63
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Table 2.3: Summary statistics on outcome variables
Variable N Mean Std.Dev Min Max
1985
gross monthly income 4125 2983.33 1382.73 0 19000
net monthly income 4277 2029.74 959.23 0 13000
1995
gross monthly income 3242 4524.49 3038.21 0 99999
net monthly income 3287 2984.71 1845.25 0 50000
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Table 2.4: Summary statistics on education
Variable N Mean Std.Dev Min Max
1985
years of schooling 4617 11.47 2.78 7 19.5
Hauptschule 4617 0.43 0.50 0 1
Realschule 4617 0.34 0.48 0 1
Fachhochschulreife 4617 0.03 0.18 0 1
Abitur 4617 0.09 0.29 0 1
Apprenticeship 4617 0.64 0.48 0 1
University degree 4617 0.10 0.30 0 1
1995
years of schooling 3457 12.00 2.87 7 19.5
Hauptschule 3455 0.40 0.49 0 1
Realschule 3455 0.34 0.47 0 1
Fachhochschulreife 3455 0.05 0.23 0 1
Abitur 3455 0.13 0.34 0 1
Apprenticeship 3457 0.69 0.46 0 1
University degree 3457 0.14 0.34 0 1
Source: GSOEP1985 and 1995 (100% version)
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Table 2.5: Summary statistics on exogenous variables
Variable N Mean Std.Dev Min Max
1985
sex 4617 0.29 0.45 0 1
age 4617 37.18 10.06 20 55
experience 4617 20.70 10.54 0 43
tenure 4606 9.74 8.06 0 56.6
changed place 
since childhood
3181 0.60 0.49 0 1
1995
sex 3457 0.31 0.46 0 1
age 3457 37.00 9.70 20 55
experience 3457 20.00 9.99 1 43
tenure 3457 9.74 8.77 0 41.3
changed place 
since childhood
2274 0.64 0.48 0 1
Source: GSOEP1985 and 1995 (100% version), own calculations
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Table 2.6: Percentage of sample with given instrument status
individual grew up in ... 1985 1995
p ci ... a city 21.90 19.09
pc2 ... a city or a big town 36.28 33.27
pc3 ... some urban area 58.74 54.12
Source: GSOEP 1985 (N=4617) and 1995 (N=3457), own calculations
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Table 2.7: OLS and IV results
1985 1995
OLS
6.71 6.54
(6.31;7.11) (6.12;6.96)
IVE: place of childhood
city (pci) 12.63 12.58
(7.89;17.39) (8.45;16.70)
1st stage t 6.737 7.087
partial R2 0.0098 0.0141
city or big town (pc2) 12.49 9.67
(9.00; 15.98) (6.91;12.45)
1st stage t 9.247 9.691
partial R2 0.0183 0.0265
urban (pc3) 13.28 9.22
(7.94;18.63) (6.95;11.48)
1st stage t 6.131 11.387
partial R2 0.0081 0.0362
IVE: place of childhood * poor family background
pcl*(poor fbq) 10.65 11.17
(6.76; 14.55) (7.57;14.77)
1st stage t -7.848 -7.361
partial R2 0.0075 0.0105
pc2*(poor fbq) 9.86 11.29
(7.44;12.28) (8.34;14.25)
1st stage t -11.721 -9.512
partisd R2 0.0142 0.0176
pc3*(poor fbq) 9.33 9.68
(7.58;11.08) (7.77;11.60)
1st stage t -15.795 -13.845
partial R2 0.0219 0.0273
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Table 2.8: Actual average years of schooling by instrument status and family background 
quart ile
fbql fbq2 fbq3 fbq4
1985
City 1079 11.45 12.23 13.36
City or big town 10.66 11.36 12.19 13.54
Urban area 10.44 11.05 12.11 13.28
1995
City 11.46 11.64 12.48 14.13
City or big town 11.59 11.57 12.49 13.97
Urban area 11.18 11.44 12.49 13.88
Source: GSÔEP 1985 and 1995, own calculations
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Table 2.9: Distribution of family background and individual variables across those ’counter- 
factual schooling quart iles’
B ackground quartile 1 2 3 4 A vg .
Father’s ed ucation
High school degree 0.00 0.26 2.43 20.85 5.76
Professional school 0.25 2.35 4.59 23.34 7.59
University degree 0.00 0.00 0.00 16.68 4.07
No schooling degree 35.30 23.67 0.09 0.09 15.01
M oth er’s education
High school degree 0.00 0.00 0.35 6.83 1.75
Professional school 0.25 1.65 3.47 12.87 4.48
University degree 0.00 0.09 0.09 3.11 0.80
No schooling degree 42.29 30.72 0.87 0.80 18.93
Parental presence 0.00 30.64 96.01 95.21 54.86
P la ce  of childhood
City 19.63 20.19 22.36 25.55 21.90
City or big town 33.87 33.86 35.44 42.15 36.28
Urban 56.11 59.18 56.93 62.91 58.74
C hange o f  place 55.46 61.74 62.02 58.86 60.14
Fem ale 48.19 25.76 30.59 11.36 29.22
M ean age 40.59 35.90 38.04 34.00 37.18
frequency of respective characteristic by family background quartile; definition of quartiles based on 
regression of schooling level on family background variables (and age) for individuals from rural 
background and subsequent predictions for all observations as ’counterfactual schooling level if individual
had grown up in a rural area’
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Table 2.10: Covariate weights
fbql fbq2 fbq3 fbq4
1985
City 23.05 22.95 25.52 28.49
City or big town 24.00 23.22 24.42 28.36
Urban area 24.56 25.07 24.23 26.14
1995
City 16.21 26.06 27.88 29.85
City or big town 18.00 25.91 26.61 29.48
Urban area 19.99 25.28 26.19 28.54
Note: w q is the fraction in each quartile 
Source: GSOEP 1985 and 1995, own calculations
Table 2.11: Differences in schooling by instrument status
1985 1985 1995 1995
Z =  ... 0 1 0 1
City 11.32 12.04 11.85 12.59
City or big town 11.17 12.01 11.73 12.53
Urban area 11.10 11.74 11.56 12.36
Source: GSOEP 1985 and 1995, own calculations
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Figure 2.2: Educational attainment as a function of schooling 
infrastructure
o abirate ---------- Fitted values
Note: the Figure plots the rate of school leavers having Abitur against the log of the number of 
“Gymnasium" per square kilometer
Source: data provided by the regional statistical offices (Statistische Landesamter) for the years 1996, 
1997 or 1998 according to availability.
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Figure 2.3: A ctual average education difference by instrum ental status using p c i
(1985 data)
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Figure 2.4: Actual average education difference by instrumental status using pci
(1995 data)
o a v s c t o  A a v s c l 1
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Figure 2.5: CDF difference using p c i as an instrum ent (1985 data)
Instrument pel
sc
Note: the figure displays the fraction o f the population who received at least one more 
year o f schooling due to the instrument
Calculated as the difference in the CDF: Pr(S<j | Z=0,X)-Pr(S<j | Z=1,X)
The 95% confidence bands are calculated using the conventional formula for a difference 
in proportions.
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Figure 2.6: CDF difference by family background quartiie using p c i as an instrument
(1985 data)
o s c d f l q l  a  s c d f 1 q 2
□ s c d f1 q 3  - s c d f 1 q 4
Note: the figure displays the fraction o f  the population who received at least one more year o f 
schooling due to the instrument.
Calculated as the difference in the CDF: Pr(S<j|Z=0,X,Q)-Pr(S<j|Z=l,X,Q)
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Figure 2.7: CDF difference using p c i as an  instrum ent (1995 data)
Instrument p d
sc
Note: the figure displays the fraction o f  the population who received at least one more 
year of schooling due to the instrument.
Calculated as the difference in the CDF: Pr(S<j | Z=0,X)-Pr(S<j | Z=1,X)
The 95% confidence bands are calculated using the conventional formula for a difference 
in proportions.
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Figure 2.8: CDF difference by family background quartile using p c i as an instrument
(1995 data)
o s c d f l q !  
□ sc d f  1 q3
a  scdf  1 q2 
s c d f l q 4
iij
- . 0 5  -
5 1 0
sc
—r  1 5 2 0
Note: the figure displays the fraction o f the population who received at least one more year o f  
schooling due to the instrument.
Calculated as the difference in the CDF: Pr(S<j|Z=0,X,Q)-Pr(S<j|Z=l,XiQ)
^  H  ^ nn tiff*»
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Chapter 3
D isplacem ent in Germany
3.1 Introduction
Worker displacement, usually defined as the separation of workers for economic reasons, has 
attracted much attention in recent years. While it has been a subject of extensive studies in 
the US, interest in Europe has only recently arisen. Most US studies (e.g. Topel (1990) and 
Ruhm (1991)) find substantial and long-lasting effects of job loss on annual earnings and 
wages. In the short run, annual earnings of a typical blue-collar worker fall by 40 percent, 
most of which is caused by reduced labor supply (unemployment and weeks worked), though 
wage reductions are also substantial. In the longer run, workers’ losses are mainly due to 
reduced wages, especially among experienced workers, those who are displaced from union 
jobs, and those who change occupation or industry after displacement.
Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993a and b) bring forward two additional results. 
First, displaced workers’ losses begin mounting before separation. Second, losses are large 
even for those who find jobs in similar firms.
Stevens (1997) shows that much of the persistence in earnings losses can be explained by 
additional job losses.
Displacement is not only a negative personal experience but is also an important policy 
issue: where the short-run losses dominate, financial aid might be the major remedy. How­
ever, if the long-run losses are substantial, training programs giving workers the knowledge 
needed to return to higher-paid positions can be an important aid.
At the same time earnings losses following displacement can be informative about the 
empirical importance of models of wage formation like human capital theory, search and 
matching theory, and contract theory.
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So, displacement is of both theoretical and policy interest and it is important to see 
whether the US findings translate to Europe and in particular Germany. Hitherto, there 
are only very few studies about displacement in Germany. Buttler and Bellmann (1991) use 
data from the German social insurance file (the so-called IAB1 data set) to analyze earnings 
losses of displaced workers. Since the IAB data do not contain information on the cause 
of separations, they define displaced workers as workers who leave a job in an industry, 
where employment decreased between 1974 and 1986 by 30 percent or more. Their result 
is that earnings losses are restricted to older and unskilled workers while employees with a 
completed vocational training or professionals gain by leaving their firm.
Bender, Dustmann and Meghir (1998) use the IAB data together with an additional firm 
data set. Displacement is then defined as ’’losing one’s job in a firm that closes within two 
years after separation”. They state that displaced workers experience a positive wage growth 
throughout. Only when the sample is restricted to the group of displaced workers with an 
intervening unemployment spell of at least two years, the post-displacement wage is lower 
than the pre-displacement wage (the actual level depending on previous job tenure).
Bur da and Mertens (2001), whose analysis is based on the same IAB data set, offer a 
different solution to the identification problem: starting with the GSOEP which contains 
information about the reasons for job displacement, they estimate a probit (l=displaced, 
0=not displaced) on the sub-sample of the unemployed and use this to impute displacement 
in the IAB data set. They draw the conclusion that workers in the first pre-displacement 
wage quartile gain by displacement while the other three quartiles lose, the average wage 
loss being -3.64%.
Couch (2001) uses the GSOEP to study the effects of displacement due to firm closure. 
Since separate information on firm closure is only available from 1991 onwards, Couch re­
stricts his sample to the period 1991-1996. He uses annual earnings and a count of annual 
months of unemployment as the dependent variables. Couch finds that in the year of dis­
placement, annual earnings decline by about 13.5%, and that the typical worker experiences 
between 6 and 10 additional days of annual unemployment. Two years later, annual earnings 
are only 6.5% less than before displacement, and the largest estimated increase in annual 
unemployment is 4 days.
Grund (1999) uses the GSOEP to analyze possible stigma effects associated with dismissal 
as opposed to displacement due to plant closings.
This paper adds to the existing literature by analyzing heterogeneity in the costs of dis­
placement between meaningful subgroups of workers. While Burda and Mertens consider
JIAB stands for /n stitu t für Arbeitsmarkt- und ßerufsforschung, the institute that maintains the data.
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differences in the costs of displacement across quartiles of the pre-displacement wage distrib­
ution, I construct a more comprehensive measure of the propensity of being displaced. In the 
spirit of propensity score matching, I estimate a probit regression of displacement in one of 
the years 1984-1995 on variables describing worker and firm characteristics in 1984. I use the 
predicted probability of displacement to regroup individuals into two meaningful subgroups. 
Comparing workers with equal probability of displacement but different actual treatment 
status, I find that workers at high risk of being displaced do not lose by displacement while 
those at low risk of being displaced lose about 16 percent in earnings in the years following 
displacement. Furthermore, I address a neglected issue in defining the sample period when 
using an econometric setup following Jacobson et al. My results overall corroborate the 
findings by Burda and Mertens.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: section 2 presents definitions of (the 
event of) displacement. Section 3 describes the data, gives an overview of the possibilities 
of defining the costs of displacement and relates them to the theoretical literature. Section 
4 assesses the econometric methodology needed to analyze displacement. Section 5 presents 
the empirical results. Section 6 concludes and gives an outlook on possibilities for further 
work.
3.2 Defining Displacement
Theoretically speaking, displacement is defined as the involuntary termination of a position, 
excluding dismissals for cause.
In Germany, so far, mainly the social insurance file (IAB) has been used in empirical 
work. The main benefit of using an administrative data set like the IAB sample are its large 
sample size and its (supposedly) higher reliability. These advantages, however, come at a 
cost. The IAB data only report the event of job separation while the GSOEP also gives the 
(self-reported) reason for job separation (quit, layoff, maternity leave etc.). Furthermore, 
the GSOEP has a richer set of demographic variables.
Given the lack of information on the reason of job separation, studies using the IAB 
data have to define or impute displacement in some w'ay. Bellmann and Butler (1991) define 
displaced workers as workers who leave a job in an industry, where employment decreased 
between 1974 and 1986 by 30 percent or more. Their definition necessarily misses displaced 
workers in industries that do not contract by as much as 30 percent. Bender, Dustmann, and 
Meghir (1998) define as displaced those workers who separate from firms which close within 
two years before closure. Their group of displaced therefore does not include laid off people
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in ongoing firms. Burda and Mertens (2001) offer a different solution to the identification 
problem: starting with the GSOEP which contains information about the reasons for job 
> displacement, they estimate a probit (l=displaced, 0=not displaced) on the sub-sample of the 
unemployed and use this to impute displacement in the IAB data set. As they acknowledge, 
this introduces measurement error because ” [s]ome individuals will be predicted as displaced 
when not (false positives or Type I error) while others are classified as not displaced when 
in fact they are (false negatives or Type II error).”
In contrast, workers’ responses to survey questions allow us to identify all layoffs (though 
probably including layoffs for cause). However, responses might be less precise than firms’ 
records. Survey questions usually only ask for the last job change and we might therefore 
miss multiple job changes. In addition, there is usually a considerable amount of recall bias 
in timing the date of layoff.
In any case is it interesting and important to investigate displacement with both kinds 
of data sets and this paper tries to contribute to this issue by exploiting the GSOEP infor­
mation.
3.3 The data
3.3.1 The German Socioeconomic Panel (GSOEP)
For the analysis of displacement, the GSOEP (see Holst, Lillard, and DiPrete, 2001, and the 
appendix for further details) contains all the information necessary. In the annual surveys, 
individuals are asked about their current labor market status and retrospective information 
going back to the beginning of the previous calendar year is collected. In case of a job change 
since the previous survey, respondents are asked the reason for job change: ’’Why did you 
leave this job? Which one of the following applies to you?” and can choose among several 
answers including terminated by employer, firm closed down (from 1991 on) and quit the job. 
I define individuals as displaced if they declare terminated by employer or firm closed down 
as reasons for a job change since the previous survey.
Moreover, the GSOEP contains a rich set of job-related and demographic characteristics 
that I use as control variables in the estimation. The variables used reflect factors known to 
influence labor market behavior and outcomes: age and age squared, a set of dummy variables 
indicating education and vocational training (less than high school degree, high school degree 
or equivalent, more than high school degree), firm size, industry and job tenure. Table 3.1 
shows some descriptive statistics referring to the base year 1984 for the sample used in the
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estimations.
1 exclude from the analysis civil servants, self-employed, trainees, and workers in agri­
culture. I drop observations with missing information on one of the variables. Furthermore, 
I drop full-time employed individuals with unreasonably low monthly gross incomes of less 
than 1000 DM.2 The whole analysis below is based on samples A (West-Germans) and B (for­
eigners) of the GSOEP.3 1 use a dummy for foreigners. In view of the fixed effects regressions 
below, I only keep individuals with at least two years of non-missing observations.
Before discussing the dependent variables, I show some descriptive statistics about the 
distribution of job changes.
3,3.2 Descriptive statistics
Table 3.2 is based on waves 2 through 12 (year 1985 through 1995) of the GSOEP and 
captures all job changes (i.e. job-to-job shifts, job-to-unemployment shifts, and job-to- 
nonemployment shifts).
The percentage of the displaced4 among all job separators - those whose employment 
relation ends - is 15.4 percent. More revealing for the importance of job displacement is the 
next column: 36.8 percent of those who experienced a job change since the last interview and 
are still unemployed at the current interview have been displaced. The above table shows 
another fact which is in accordance with theory: The percentage of job quitters (voluntary 
leave) among all job separations is 32.5 percent while it is considerably lower (15.9 percent) 
for those still unemployed at the interview date. Quitters find a job much more easily (and 
probably only quit if they have already found a new job ?!) than the displaced.
Table 3.3 shows the percentage of displaced to non-displaced job separators across occu­
pations. Since some occupations only contain very few observations I had to aggregate some 
groups.
Considering the whole period, 1985-1995, there is a remarkable difference in occupational 
distribution between displaced and non-displaced job separators. Production workers are 
more likely to be displaced than to separate for other reasons.
2 Results are robust with respect to this cut-off point.
3Note that the foreign sample consists of households where the household head is of Turkish, Greek, 
Yugoslavian, Spanish, or Italian nationality (the five largest groups of foreign nationals). It consists mainly 
of 'guest workers’ who came to Germany in the 1950’s and 1960’s already and who have therefore already 
assimilated to the native German population.
4Those people answering that the reason for job change was ’’termination by the employer” or ’’company 
closed down” .
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A more comprehensive picture of the factors characterizing displacement is provided by 
the probit estimation beneath.
3.3.3 The outcomes
This section describes the two measures of the cost of displacement used in this study and 
gives a brief overview of related theoretical models.
The costs of displacement are typically measured in terms of either wages or labor earn­
ings. These variables are informative about different dimensions of the costs of displacement.
1) Labor earnings are the most direct measure of the cost of displacement and capture 
the monetary loss associated with displacement. This measure contains the effect of both 
wage changes and in labor supply. Simply put, earning 50% less after displacement can 
be due to both earning half of the previous wage or earning the same wage as before but 
working half-time. It is therefore a relatively atheoretic, descriptive measure of the costs of 
displacement.
2) The variable of interest in theoretical models, however, usually is the wage rate because 
it relates to marginal productivity, wage premia, and wage seniority. I use gross monthly 
income in the month before the interview. Since I restrict the sample to the full-time 
employed, using monthly income is equivalent to using hourly wages. I choose gross income 
because this measures the firm’s valuation of the worker as opposed to net income which 
makes results less clear by mixing them up with tax effects. The progressive German tax 
system compresses the wage structure in a way that provides insurance (subsidizes) against 
the cost of displacement because lower marginal tax rates in lower earnings categories is 
equivalent to a smaller net displacement loss as opposed to the gross displacement cost.
The most prominent explanation of wage premia and wage seniority is human capital 
theory (Becker, 1975). The main distinction is between general human capital and sector- 
and/or firm-specific human capital. General human capital cannot explain earnings losses 
following displacement since it is transferable across firms. However, human capital accumu­
lated in a specific firm (sector) might be of limited use in another firm (sector). Therefore, 
the return to investment in specific human capital given by a higher wage for the employee 
can be destroyed upon displacement. In the new position, the worker starts with his stock 
of general human capital but with no specific capital. Consequently, there will be no wage 
premium in the new job.
Search and matching theory is another candidate to explain earnings losses. Pioneered 
by Jovanovic (1979a and b), the basic idea of this literature is that both firms and work­
ers are heterogeneous and therefore good matches have to be searched for. In the sequel,
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highly-productive matches will survive longer than bad matches and will be more highly 
compensated. In case the match is destroyed, earnings losses will occur on the new job. Put 
differently, to find a highly-paid reemployment possibility workers have to search longer.
Lazear’s model (1981) of a promotion-from-within policy yields another explanation of 
wage seniority and corresponding particularly high earnings losses for high-tenure workers: 
to give young workers the incentive to stay with the firm, they are paid a low wage (below 
marginal productivity) with the prospect of earning a high wage (above their marginal pro­
ductivity) when older. Within this model, losing a job means beginning in jobs farther down 
the promotion ladder.
This short overview of theoretical models motivates why wre might expect income losses 
following displacement but I do not attempt to test those theories.
3.4 The econometric approach
A simple approach to measuring earnings losses is to take the difference betwreen post- and 
pre-displacement earnings as dependent variable and regress it on a number of explanatory 
variables. This measure has several shortcomings: it only captures the short-run effects of 
displacement and it does not take into account the (counterfactual) earnings growth that 
might have occurred in the absence of displacement.
The following more sophisticated approach takes potential earnings into account: denote 
by Dls the binomial variable that takes the value 1 if worker i was displaced at date s, and 
0 otherwise. Then, we can compare actual earnings at date t  following displacement to the 
expected earnings had the worker not been displaced:
E(yit\Dis =  l ) - E ( y it\Dia = 0) (3.1)
Since this does not rule out that worker i was displaced at some other time than date 
s, w'hich would be the case of multiple displacements, it makes sense to focus on the case 
where there is the single displacement date s:
E(yit\Dis =  1) -  E{yit\Dik =  0 for all k) (3.2)
This latter expression better captures the effect of job loss on workers’ earnings and career 
than one job loss out of several consecutive ones.5
5The costs associated with multiple job losses are a different issue which has been analyzed by Stevens 
(1997).
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In a next step, we will want to condition on worker characteristics in addition to dis­
placement status. One way to do this is to condition on the information set containing 
information about worker i at the date of displacement:
£(ytt|Du =  1, hs) -  E(yit\Dik -  0 for all k, Iis) (3.3)
According to Jacobson et al. (1993a), this captures only part of the adverse effects 
associated with displacement. Since firm conditions leading to displacement might already 
affect earnings in the periods before this event, a full image of displacement should include 
these adverse pre-displacement losses. This effect is illustrated in Figure 3.1.
Assume that p periods (p — 4 in Figure 3.1) before displacement, it becomes known that 
displacement is going to take place at date s. Then, earnings of displaced workers can be 
compared to earnings that these workers expected to receive at date s — p:
E{yit\Di3 =  1, Ii3- P) -  E(yit\Dik =  0 for all fc, Ii3-P) (3.4)
The information set should of course include variables that influence earnings.
The econometric implementation of (3.4) can be achieved by estimating the following 
augmented version of a standard earnings equations & la Mincer (1974):
Vu ~  <*t +  7 t +  Xuf3 +  5 2  [d_m 4,...,d_0,..., diago]it *<5 +  eit (3.5)
which includes a set of dummy variables representing the event of displacement. The 
notation is as follows: d_inhit =  1 in year t if worker i is going to be displaced in year 
t +  k, d_0it — 1 if he is going to be displaced in this year6, and d_k&goit =  1 if worker i 
was displaced in year t -  k. This scheme is explained in the following simple example for a 
worker who was displaced in 1990:
d_inA d_in3 d_in2 d_in l d_0 dlago d2ago dZago dAago
1988 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
1989 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
1990 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
1991 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
Note that we cannot use all years of data (1984-1995) in the regressions because the 
displacement dummies are only well-defined in the central period of data (1988-1991 in our
6More than 90% of the interviews takes place in February, March, and April.
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case where the dummy window stretches out from t — 4 to t +  4).7 In the years outside 
the central period, we have no information about treatment status. In the first year of 
data, 1984, for example, we do not know if a worker was displaced in one of the previous 
years, and therefore the dummies diago, d3ago, d2ago, and dlago are not well-defined. By 
the same token, in the last year of data, 1995, we do not know if a worker is going to be 
displaced in one of the subsequent years, and therefore the dummies d_inl, d_m2, d_in3, 
and ef_m4 are not well-defined. This is a crucial point often neglected by other studies. In 
their seminal paper Jacobson et al.(1993) use all years of data in their regressions and set 
those dummies equal to zero and thereby introduce a potential bias by misclassifying some 
(actually) treated units as controls. A correct treatment of the issue requires to first choose 
the set of dummies thought to describe the displacement event and to adjust the period of 
data used in the regressions accordingly.
The remaining variables are included to control for other general factors that influence 
earnings. The vector xit includes observed, time-varying characteristics of the worker. 7 t 
captures the general time pattern of earnings in the economy and at measures the worker- 
specific effect. The error term 6a is assumed to be of constant variance and to be uncorrelated 
across individuals and time. The control group is the group of workers that are continuously 
employed throughout the whole sample period.8
3.4.1 Treatment of the unemployed
The treatment of displaced workers unemployed in the month before the interview and 
therefore not reporting monthly income needs special discussion. Jacobson et a1. set their 
quarterly income to zero and not e.g. to the level of unemployment benefits. This choice 
is arbitrary and partly explains the huge losses of up to 40% reported for US workers. I 
decided to omit the relevant person-year observation from the wage regression. This might 
introduce sample selection if those unemployed after displacement are not a random subgroup 
of the displaced. Sample selection models in panel data are computationally very demanding 
(see Kyriazidou, 1997). If the sample size was bigger, I could estimate a selection (into 
unemployment) equation on the sample of the displaced only and then introduce a selection 
term in the earnings equation. Taking into consideration that the sample size is small, it 
is not possible to follow this approach. For this reason, the results should be interpreted
71986-1993 in the case where the dummy window stretches out from t — 2 to f -i- 2. Other cases follow 
accordingly.
8More precisely, our comparison group are all workers that are employed at all interviews, and have never 
been displaced.
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conditional on employment.
3.5 Empirical Analysis
3.5.1 OLS results
We start out by showing results of the OLS regression9
Vu = 7 1 +  +  ^ 2  [d_fn4,...,d_0,..., dAago]it *6 +  eit (3.6)
i.e. (3.5) ignoring the worker-specific fixed effect a*. We use monthly gross earnings as 
dependent variable. Remember that we use income data for the period 1988-1991 whereas 
data for all the years 1984-1995 are utilized to define the displacement dummies. The results 
shown in Table 3.4 give a purely descriptive picture of the earnings differences between 
displaced and non-displaced workers and should not be interpreted causally.
In addition to the control variables described above, I include time dummies to control 
for business cycle effects.
Turning to the coefficients of the displacement dummies it appears that the displaced 
already earn about 4 to 5 percent less10 1than the control group before displacement though 
the effect is not statistically significant. There is a significant drop in earnings in the year 
immediately before displacement and earnings differences of up to 15 percent in the years 
after displacement. The coefficient in the year after displacement (dlago) which is smaller 
(and statistically insignificant) than the other post-displacement coefficients might be ex­
plained by the fact that it only captures those workers that immediately find a (comparable) 
job while those unemployed at the interview have a missing observation in that year and 
only reenter estimation in the second year after displacement.
Hitherto, I have not included job tenure as an explanatory factor. This is done in Table 3.5 
by introducing a dummy for job tenure of more than 4 years.11 Pre-displacement earnings 
differences are unaffected and post-displacement earnings differences become smaller but 
remain significant. Thus, displacement losses can not only be explained by a loss in seniority.
Now, I want to go beyond the basically descriptive picture given by the OLS results 
■which mixes up effects due to displacement and permanent differences between workers.
9Note that we employ OLS with the cluster option which adjusts standard errors for the fact that obser­
vations of the same individual i in different years are not independent of each other.
10 Remember that in semilogarithmic regressions, the percentage change induced by a dummy variable 
with coefficient 6 switching from 0 to 1 is e6 — 1 (Halvorsen and Palmquist (1980)).
11 The results do not change when using a quadratic in tenure.
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That means that we return to (3.5) which explicitly takes into account individual-specific 
fixed effects.
3.5.2 Fixed Effects Regression I
Here, I present results of fixed effects regressions based on the same sample of workers used 
in the OLS regression.
Table 3.6 shows that, conditioning on individual-specific effects, we only see a significantly 
negative effect of displacement on wages in the year of (i.e. immediately before) displacement. 
In addition, there is a significantly (though small in absolute value) positive effect on wages 
four years after displacement. This suggests that - overall - displacement is not associated 
with any substantive losses.
However, it could be the case that we measure this insignificant overall effect because the 
implicit assumption of constant coefficients on the displacement dummies across subpopula­
tions does not hold. As a consequence, different and significant effects on subgroups might 
cancel out on average and therefore yield the overall insignificant effect of displacement. To 
give an example, men's and women’s earnings might react differently to displacement and 
simply controlling for gender will only affect the constant term in the regression but not the 
slopes. The same might be true for differences between native Germans and foreigners or 
for differences across workers’ industries etc.
The most clear-cut way to proceed would be to divide the whole sample into cells defined 
by worker and job characteristics. We could then compare earnings patterns of non-displaced 
workers and displaced workers that are ” identical” to each other. This (statistical) matching 
is already prevented by data limitations because we would end up with too few workers per 
subgroup. Alternatively, we could divide the whole sample only according to one dimension 
(e.g. sex) at a time. Yet, this approach would produce a w’hole set of singular results. For 
this reason, I try to find a composite measure encompassing all the factors that are relevant 
for displacement.
3.5.3 Displacement probit
We can make this idea operational by estimating a probit in 1984 - i.e. at the beginning 
of the w'hole sample period - predicting the probability that a w'orker with certain personal 
and job characteristics will be displaced in one of the years until 1995. I will classify a 
w'orker to be at high risk of being displaced if his predicted probability of being displaced 
exceeds the average predicted displacement probability. Similarly, a wrorker is at low risk of
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being displaced if his predicted probability of being displaced lies below this threshold.12 In 
this way we homogenize subgroups of workers along several dimensions instead of dividing 
workers by some arbitrary (single) variable. The idea behind this first step is to create 
meaningful subgroups of workers that might have different earnings patterns (i.e. different 
coefficients on the displacement dummies) due to displacement. This approach is reminiscent 
of the propensity score approach because it uses pre-treatment variables to estimate the 
probability of treatment (displacement) and then compares outcomes (earnings patterns) of 
individuals with similar characteristics, i.e. having a similar propensity score.13
In addition, it is quite intuitive to consider these subgroups: given their overall char­
acteristics, some workers are more likely to be displaced and others are less likely to be 
displaced. Still, in both subgroups we have some workers that are actually displaced and 
some that remain employed as can be seen from Table 3.8 based on the results from the 
probit estimation:
The probit is of course also of interest in itself. Table 3.7 show's that it is a mix of 
characteristics that determines displacement. The displaced are on average younger, earn 
less, and have lower tenure on the job. Workers in small firms (with less than 20 workers) 
are more likely to be displaced. Firing is easier for these firms because German legislation 
only requires works councils for firms with more than 20 workers.
One surprising finding is that there is no effect of gender on the probability of being 
displaced. Interestingly enough, there are also no significant differences across education 
levels.
3.5.4 Fixed Effects Regression II
We can nowr turn to the results of the fixed-effects estimation on the two subgroups: They 
are different from the US findings (Jacobson et al. (1993)). There, earnings start decreasing 
already before displacement W'hich can be interpreted as the worker’s firm being in bad 
condition and therefore cutting wages (or weekly hours) before finally displacing the worker. 
In Germany, these w'age cuts do not show up - to  a great extent because of German labor
12As shown by Cramer (1999), it is a general feature of predicted values in probit estimation based on 
unbalanced samples (i.e. with unequal sample frequencies) that "the less frequent outcome always has lower 
estimated prediction probabilities than the other” . The within-sample percentage correctly predicted - taking 
0.5 as a cut-off level - as implemented in many statistical packages would therefore classify too many people 
as being at low risk of being displaced.
13 In a follow-up paper, I try to implement propensity score estimation of the effect of treatment (displace­
ment) on the treated (the displaced). See the last section for an outlook on this project.
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market regulations. The pre-displacement behavior of wages is therefore easy to understand.
More interesting is the difference between the two subgroups of high risk and low risk 
workers (tables 3.9 and 3.10). The fact that earnings of the high risk displaced recover so 
quickly can be seen as an indication that these workers find comparable jobs after displace­
ment. We saw in the probit estimation that these are mainly workers who had lower earnings 
anyway which cannot drop much further because collective wage agreements imply de facto 
minimum wages in most industries. In contrast, those at low risk of being displaced used 
to earn more to begin with and had higher job tenure. As a separate analysis on only the 
continuously employed workers show’s, tenure is a significant factor explaining earnings for 
the subgroup of low risk workers while it has no explanatory power for those at high risk of 
being displaced. This finding corresponds with the intuition that those at low risk of being 
displaced have profited from sizeable rents wiiich they lose upon displacement. These results 
are in line with dual labor market theory (see Saint-Paul,1996). In the primary layer of the 
labor market, jobs are quite safe and workers earn more than workers in the secondary labor 
market. As the results show, higher job security in the primary labor market comes at a 
price: when being laid off, these workers lose more than those laid off from the secondary 
labor market.
The results presented so far were all based on monthly gross earnings as dependent 
variable. I repeated the above estimation with yearly labor income. The results are very 
similar as regards the general pattern o f the displacement coefficients. However, now-’ the
main effect occurs in the year of displacement (cf_0), the coefficient being -0.21 for the high
risk workers and -0.26 for the low risk workers. This indicates that on average the displaced 
lose a lot in yearly labor income because many of them go through a period of unemployment.
To sum up, it is unemployment following displacement wiiich hurts a considerable share 
of the displaced in the short run, while only those at low risk of being displaced have a 
long-run negative effect on earnings.14
3.6 Conclusion and outlook
In this paper I presented theoretical definitions of displacement and described ways to identify 
them in empirical w’ork. Then, I suggested variables measuring the cost of displacement and
14I also estimated a Cox proportional hazard model to explain survival times in unemployment. Displaced 
workers going through unemployment do not differ from all other unemployed suggesting that there is no 
particular stigma effect for the displaced. This result ties in with Grund (1999) who does not find any stigma 
effects associated with dismissal as opposed to displacement due to (supposedly exogenous) plant closings.
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The empirical part showed important differences with US findings: contrary to the US, 
in Germany earnings do not start decreasing before displacement. Post-displacement wage 
losses do not occur for all workers. I defined and identified two subgroups of workers: 
those at high risk of being displaced and those at low risk of being displaced. Within the 
first subgroup, those actually displaced do not incur earnings losses compared to their non* 
displaced counterparts. In contrast, the displaced in the second group lose up to 16% in 
earnings in the second and third year after displacement, and therefore have to bear a long- 
lasting cost of displacement.
My results are in line with the results by Burda and Mertens who also find heterogeneity in 
wage losses. They estimate wage losses to be most pronounced for workers in the upper three 
pre-displacement wage quartiles. To the extent that the pre-displacement wage distribution 
is a main correlating factor of the propensity of being displaced, my results yield a robustness 
check for their finding. Furthermore, my results go beyond theirs by showing that losses are 
not restricted to  the short run.
The approach of re-grouping workers into two more homogeneous groups, defined by 
similar propensity of being displaced, goes some way towards comparing likes and thereby 
towards establishing a clean causal effect of displacement on earnings. Yet, we can improve 
on the current procedure by rigorously employing propensity score matching. The propensity 
score is defined by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) as the conditional probability of receiving 
the treatment given the pre-treatment variables. The probit estimation above was essentially 
a propensity score estimation. However, the current approach falls short of establishing the 
balancing property of the propensity score15 according to which observations with the same 
propensity score must have the same distribution of observable covariates independently of 
treatment status.
In a follow-up paper, I use the algorithm outlined in the appendix to estimate the propen­
sity score. The average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) is typically estimated using 
one of several estimators proposed in the evaluation literature, e.g. the Stratification method, 
the Best Matching method and the Radius Matching method (see Heckman et al. 1998 and 
Lechner 1999). It is not straightforward to apply one of these estimators to this case. My 
treatment is non-standard because I do not have a single treatment dummy but treatment 
is described by the whole set of dummies (d _ in 4 ,...,d _0 ,..., dAago). For this reason, I can­
not simply compute the ATT as a single number but the ATT is given by a whole set of 
numbers (namely the coefficients of the displacement dummies in a regression). The idea
I5See again Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983).
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of the follow-up paper is to implement an equivalent of the Stratification method in the 
following way: by regressing - block by block16 - log income on a constant term and the set 
of displacement dummies. Since the treatment spans an extended period of time (recall that 
treatment is defined as displacement in any of the years 1984-1995) and some observable 
characteristics that affect earnings might change independent from displacement, I include 
contemporary variables as further controls in the regressions. To control for unobservable 
factors in earnings potentials, fixed effects estimators are used to purge individual-specific 
fixed effects. The displacement losses for the overall population are given by the weighted 
average of displacement losses across blocks where the weights are given by the number of 
treated observations in the block. It is of course informative by itself to see if and how 
displacement losses vary by block. Alternatively, I could run a single regression with a full 
set of displacement-dummy*block-interactions.17
The main problem in applying the propensity score matching procedure to the GSOEP 
data is probably the relatively small sample size. Still, it seems to be a promising approach 
to treat displacement along the lines of the program evaluation literature.
16 Using the blocks generated by the algorithm to estimate the propensity score.
17 Both approaches are reminiscent of the ’’conditional difference-in-differences'* approach outlined by Heck­
man, Ichimura, Smith, and Todd (1998). They propose to apply difference-in-differences - and fixed effects 
is similar - to a sample, that is already matched on pre-treatment observable variables, in order to remove 
also unobservable differences.
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3.7 Appendix
3.7.1 Algorithm for the estimation of the propensity score
The algorithm to estimate the propensity score consists o f the following steps:
1. Estimate the probit model:
Pr{Di =  1|*} =  * ( h ( X i ) )
where $  denotes the normal c.d.f. and h(X{) is a starting specification which includes 
all the covariates as linear terms without interactions or higher order terms.
2. Split the sample in 5 equally spaced intervals of the propensity score.
3. Within each interval test that the average propensity score of treated and control units 
do not differ.
4. If the test fails in one interval, split the interval in halfs and test again.
5. Continue until, in all blocks, the average propensity score of treated and control units 
do not differ.
6. Within each interval, test the balancing property, i.e. that the means of each covariate 
do not differ between treated and control units.
7. If the means of one or more covariates differ, start again from the beginning with a 
different specification of h(X*).
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Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics for the year 1984
Variable Mean Std.Dev.
Individual characteristics
Female 0.20 0.4
Foreign 0.34 0.47
Age 37.31 8.29
Age2/ 100 14.61 6.09
Less than high school 0.45 0.48
High schol or equiv. 0.48 0.5
More than high school 0.07 0.26
J o b /firm  characteristics
Log(gross monthly inc.) 7.8 0.31
Long tenure (>4  years) 0.82 0.38
Small firm (<20) 0.13 0.34
In du stry  dum m ies
Energy 0.01 0.12
Mining 0.01 0.08
Manufacturing 0.58 0.49
Construction 0.11 0.32
Trade 0.05 0.23
Transport 0.04 0.19
Banking, Insurance 0.04 0.19
Services 0.15 0.36
Number of observations 861
Source: Own calculations based on GSOEP, wave 1, subsamples A B
w w M UM w m w m w
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Table 3.2: Type of jobs separations
reason for job shift all jo b  separations
workers unemployed 
a t interview date
displaced 761 328
quit 1605 142
end of fixed term  contract 589 155
other 1989 267
total num ber of observ. 4944 892
Source: Own calculations based on GSOEP, waves 1-12, subsamples A & B
Table 3.3: Distribution of the displaced across occupations
1985-1995 1985-1990 1991-1995
Occupation Displ, N ot Displ. Displ. N ot Displ. Displ. Not Displ.
Execut.&Profess.&Technic. 11.5 18.8 8.6 19.1 14.0 18,3
Sales &Adminis. Support 29.1 37.3 25.8 37.4 31.9 37.2
Service Jobs 8.1 8.9 9.3 7.2 7.0 10.9
Production Jobs 48.8 32.4 53.6 33.3 44.7 31.3
O ther 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.9 2.3 2.2
Source: Own calculations based on GSOEP, waves 1-12, subsamples A & B
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Table 3.4: OLS Regression with robust standard errors, 1988-1991
Variable Coefficient Std. Error
Age 0.041 0.009
Age2/100 -0.046 0.011
1989 0.010 0.005
1990 0.035 0.006
1991 0.047 0.007
Less than high school -0.022 0.024
More than high school 0.457 0.048
Foreign -0.189 0.023
Female -0.237 0.019
D isp lacem ent in  4 years -0.042 0.026
D isp lacem ent in  3 years -0.018 0.027
D isp lacem ent in  2 years -0.043 0.028
D isp lacem ent in  1 years -0.048 0.031
D isp lacem en t th is  year -0.079 0.029
D isp lacem ent 1 year ago -0.054 0.052
D isp lacem ent 2 years ago -0.148 0.068
D isp lacem ent 3 years ago -0.143 0.034
D isp lacem ent 4  years ago -0.088 0.042
Constant 7.147 0.181
Number of obs =  3288 
Number of persons =  861 
R-squared — 0.4034
Notes: Dependent variable: log of gross monthly income. Further controls: industry dummies.
Source: GSOEP, subsamples A B
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Table 3.5: OLS Regression with robust standard errors controlling for tenure, 1988-1991
Variable Coefficient Std.Error
Age 0.040 0.009
Age2/100 -0.045 0.011
1989 0.009 0.005
1990 0.036 0.006
1991 0.047 0.007
Less than high school -0.023 0.024
More than high school 0.460 0.049
Foreign -0.189 0.023
Female -0.239 0.019
Tenure>4 0.055 0.036
D isp lacem ent in  4 years -0.038 0.026
D isp lacem ent in  3 years -0.016 0.027
D isp lacem ent in  2 years -0.036 0.028
D isp lacem ent in  1 years -0.044 0.031
D isp lacem ent th is  year -0.073 0.029
D isp lacem ent 1 year ago -0.008 0.061
D isp lacem ent 2 years ago -0.108 0.075
D isp lacem ent 3 years ago -0.101 0.046
D isp lacem ent 4 years ago -0.058 0.046
Constant 7.104 0.184
Number of obs =  3288 
Number of persons =  861 
R-squared =  0.4046
Notes: Dependent variable: log of gross monthly income. Further controls: industry dummies.
Source: GSOEP, subsamples A k  B
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Table 3.6: Fixed effects regression on the whole sample, 1988-1991
Variable Coefficient Std.Error
Age 0.065 0.009
Age2/ 100 -0.053 0.010
1989 -0.006 0.005
1990 0.002 0.005
Tenuie>4 0.016 0.016
D isp lacem en t in  4 years -0.013 0.014
D isp lacem en t in  3 years -0.009 0.016
D isp lacem en t in  2 years -0.021 0.018
D isp lacem en t in  1 years -0.017 0.021
D isp lacem en t th is  year -0.048 0.022
D isp lacem ent 1 year ago -0.004 0.031
D isp lacem en t 2 years ago 0.006 0.029
D isp lacem en t 3 years ago 0.012 0.024
D isp lacem en t 4 years ago 0.043 0.021
Constant 6.164 0.198
Number of obs =  3288 
Number of persons =  861 
R-sq: within =  0.0671
Notes: Dependent variable: log of gross monthly income. '
Source: GSOEP, subsamples A k  B '
j
[
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Table 3.7: Displacement Probit estimates 1984
Variable Coefficient Std.Error
Log (gross monthly inc.) -0.125 0.061
Age -0.041 0.015
A ge7 l00 0.058 0.020
Tenure>4* -0.166 0.046
Small firm (<20)* 0.123 0.050
Less than high school* -0.061 0.040
More than high school* 0.018 0.066
Female* 0.003 0.042
Foreign* 0.087 0.044
(*) dF /dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
Observed probability 0.235
Predicted probability 0.217 (at x-bai)
Number of observations =  861
LR chi2(12) =  78.25 Prob > chi2 =  0.0000
Log likelihood =  -429.937
Pseudo R2 =  0.0834
Notes: Dependent variable equal to 1 if person displaced in one of the years 1984-1995, 0 otherwise.
Further controls: industry dummies.
Reference groups: service sector, German, men, high school degree, big firm 
Source: GSOEP, subsamples A «Sc B
!
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Table 3.8: Predictions based on Probit estimates 1984
predicted displaced
actually displaced 0 1 total
0 461 198 659
1 81 121 202
total 542 319 861
3.7. APPENDIX 113
Table 3.9: Fixed effects regression on the subsample of those at high risk of being displaced, 
19S8-1991
Variable Coefficient Std. Error
Age 0.076 0.014
Age2/ 100 -0.062 0.016
1989 -0.013 0.009
1990 0.002 0.009
Tenure >4 0.024 0.024
D isp lacem ent in  4 years -0.025 0.022
D isp lacem ent in 3 years -0.011 0.024
D isp lacem ent in 2 years -0.004 0.027
D isp lacem ent in 1 years 0.004 0.033
D isp lacem ent th is  year -0.054 0.034
D isp lacem ent 1 year ago 0.024 0.044
D isp lacem ent 2 years ago 0.070 0.040
D isp lacem ent 3 years ago 0.062 0.033
D isp lacem ent 4 years ago 0.080 0.028
Constant 5.683 0.327
Number of obs =  1196 
Number of persons =  319 
R-sq: within =  0.0841
Notes: Dependent variable: log of gross monthly income.
Source: GSOEP, subsamples A <Sc B
114 CHAPTER 3. DISPLACEMENT IN GERMANY
Table 3.10: Fixed effects regression on the subsample of those at low risk of being displaced, 
1988-1991
Variable Coefficient Std. Error
Age 0.059 0.012
Age2/ 100 *0.048 0.014
1989 -0.001 0.005
1990 0.004 0.005
Tenure>4 -0.012 0.022
D isp lacem ent in  4  years 0.003 0.019
D isp lacem ent in  3 years -0.008 0.022
D isp lacem ent in  2 years -0.043 0.025
D isp lacem ent in  1 years -0.053 0.029
D isp lacem ent th is  year -0.037 0.031
D isp lacem ent X year ago -0.094 0.047
D isp lacem ent 2 years ago -0.166 0.047
D isp lacem ent 3 years ago -0.134 0.043
D isp lacem ent 4 years ago -0.076 0.038
Constant 6.432 0.264
Number of obs =  2092 
Number of persons =  542 
R-sq: within =  0.0774
Notes: Dependent variable: log of gross monthly income.
Source: GSOEP, subsamples A & B
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Chapter 4
Risk-Sharing in th e Short Run and In 
th e Long Run
(Written with Mathias Hoffmann)
4.1 Introduction
Do industrialised countries use the same channels to insure against long-term and short-term 
income risks? Do they insure in different ways against different types of shocks? This paper 
aims to provide an answer to these questions.
The starting point of our analysis is the observation that most countries’ consumption 
risks do not seem to be internationally diversified. French and Poterba (1991) were the first 
to hint at the huge home biases in international equity portfolios. This non-diversification 
puzzle has been cast into various formulations that are not only based on stocks of foreign 
assets but also on flow variables. Most notably, Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1992) demon­
strated that international consumption correlations are too lowr to be explained by models 
with perfect capital mobility and complete asset markets.
A complementary perspective on international non-diversification is provided in a series 
of papers by Asdrubali, Sorensen and Yosha (1996) and Sorensen and Yosha (1998). As- 
drubali, Sorensen and Yosha (1996), henceforth ASY, suggested a simple decomposition of 
income risk that allows the investigator to distinguish between the cross-sectional and the 
intertemporal dimension of risk sharing. The cross-sectional dimension is reflected in the 
cross-border ownership of state-contingent assets such as equity or in fiscal transfer schemes. 
The intertemporal dimension is reflected in borrowing and lending, i.e. in the use of national
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or international credit markets.
In US state-level data ASY (1996) find that 39 percent of shocks to gross state product 
are smoothed by capital markets, 13 percent are smoothed by the federal government, and 
23 percent are smoothed by credit markets. Conversely, S0rensen and Yosha (1998) find that 
EU and OECD countries achieve much less cross-sectional risk sharing than do US states. 
Melitz and Zumer (1999) extended the ASY study by including further exogenous variables 
like regional size and the real interest rate. Their results by and large corroborate those of 
ASY.
The findings of the line of research surveyed here - and to which this paper aims to 
contribute - may have far-reaching implications for the prospective workings of the Euro­
pean Monetary Union. A plethora of studies documents that, in terms of Mundell’s (1961) 
classical criteria. Europe is much less of an optimum currency area than are e.g. the United 
States. In particular, macroeconomic shocks are generally found to be much less symmetric 
in Euroland than among US states. Against this background, finding out to what degree 
capital markets can contribute to the insurance of aggregate income and consumption risk 
has become a question of paramount importance: if shocks are asymmetric, perhaps they can 
be smoothed through sufficient risk sharing. A monetary union that experiences asymmetric 
macroeconomic disturbances may not appear optimal when measured against the classical 
OCA criteria but it may provide a huge pool of risks that can be optimally insured - as long j 
as the channels mentioned above are actually available and do get exploited. I
Sorensen and Yosha (1998) conclude quite negatively in this respect: given that European | 
countries do not seem to exploit risk sharing opportunities, EMU could entail high welfare i 
costs in the absence of intensified fiscal transfer mechanisms. Melitz and Zumer on the other 
hand conclude that the start of monetary union will promote the sharing of risks via market 
channels.
In this paper, we extend the method of ASY (1996) to  a fully dynamic framework1. In so 
doing, wfe use recently developed methods for the estimation of panel vector autoregressions. 
Our method allows us to assess how income uncertainty at short and long forecast horizons is 
insured. It also allow'S us to investigate how different types of income uncertainty get insured. 
The most important distinction to be made along these lines is the one between permanent 
and transitory shocks to income. Insurance against permanent idiosyncratic shocks requires 
perpetual claims on some sort of income that is negatively correlated with a country’s own 
income stream. Conversely, transitory fluctuations can be completely smoothed through
1 Athanasoulis and van Wincoop (2000) provide an analysis of risk-sharing at various time horizons but 
their model does not allow the identification of risk-sharing channels.
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borrowing and lending. A priori, we should therefore expect that permanent shocks get 
insured through different channels than transitory shocks and our econometric model allows 
us to disentangle these two types of shocks with minimal identifying restrictions.
Our results can be summarized as follows:
• Short-term and long-term risks axe insured in the same ways. The forecast horizon 
does not matter for either the choice of insurance channel nor for the extent to which 
income risk is insured overall.
• Insurance against transitory shocks to income is generally much better than against 
permanent shocks and is achieved largely through credit markets, i.e. the intertemporal 
risk sharing channel. This result ties in with the theoretical findings by Baxter and 
Crucini (1995) who demonstrated that, as long as shocks are not too persistent, the 
full risk sharing allocations that pertain in models with complete asset markets can be 
very v/ell approximated in models that only feature non-state contingent borrowing and 
lending. Whereas Baxter’s and Crucini’s wrork provides a theoretical rationalization 
of our results, a recent empirical study by Kraay, Loayza, Serven and Ventura (2000) 
has demonstrated that countries’ international portfolios are largely held in the form 
of international credit rather than equity. This is the empirical corollary that may 
explain the importance of the credit channel for the sharing of transitory income risks.
• Earlier results in the literature suggested that capital markets provide only a minimal 
share of the total consumption insurance that is achieved between countries. Even 
though the role of capital markets for consumption insurance remains limited once we 
condition on the type of shock, their role seems much more respectable than w'ould 
appear from our unconditional dynamic setup or from the results obtained in Sorensen 
and Yosha (1998). •
• There is some evidence of insurance of permanent shocks through the intertemporal 
channel. The reason for this could be that a big share of a country’s GDP cannot be 
traded on capital markets, e.g. because labour income is non-insurable. This may give 
rise to precautionary savings. Athanasoulis and Shiller (2000) have shown howr the 
degree of market incompleteness affects the incidence of precautionary savings. Our 
results lend further empirical support to their viewu
• Overall, roughly 60 percent of income variability in industrialised countries remains 
uninsured, most of it due to a failure to insure against permanent fluctuations in
income.
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Our results may also have important implications for further research into the sources 
of the home bias. It is generally found that national capital markets do much better in 
providing insurance to regions than do international capital markets in providing insurance 
to countries (compare for example the results in Asdrubali, Sorensen and Yosha (1996) 
and Sorensen and Yosha (1998)). Also, international asymmetries in output fluctuations 
are generally much more persistent than intranational ones (see for example Chamie et al. 
(1994)). At the same time, our results reveal that the failure of international capital markets 
to provide insurance is particularly due to a lack of insurance of ’permanent’ income risks. 
An important question that future research should address is therefore why international 
capital markets do so badly in providing insurance against permanent shocks.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows:
Section two outlines our dynamic econometric model of international risk sharing. In 
our empirical implementation, we rely on a panel vector autoregression that we implement 
using the method suggested by Holtz-Eakin, Newey and Rosen (1988). Our approach has 
the advantage that we only have to rely on cross-sectional asymptotics. Furthermore, we 
can identify permanent and transitory shocks to output with only minimal identifying as­
sumptions by exploiting equilibrium relations between the data. Section three describes the 
data and our empirical results. We report the results of our analysis in section four and we 
offer conclusions in section five.
4.2 A dynamic model of risk sharing
In this section we propose a dynamic econometric model that enables us to analyse how 
income risk is shared over time. More specifically, our model allows us to identify the 
relative roles of intertemporal (i.e. borrowing and lending) and cross-sectional smoothing 
(i.e. insurance through international capital markets)2.
The starting point of our analysis is the following decomposition of the variance of per 
capita GDP-growth:
va r^ g d p tllt^ )  =  cov(Ngdp -  Agnp, kgdpt\ l t- i)  (4.1)
+cov(Agnp — Ac, &gdpt\Tt-i)
+cou(Ac, /Agdpt\Tt-i)
2 Our method is closely related to Asdrubali, Sorensen and Yosha (1996). Their approach is completely 
static, however. Another difference between our model and that of ASY is that we do not allow for a fiscal 
insurance channel. Sorensen and Yosha (1998) have demonstrated that the fiscal channel is not important 
for the international dimension of risk sharing which is what we focus on in this paper.
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Lower case letters denote logarithms and gnp and c denote gross national product and 
consumption per capita respectively. The conditioning information set l t~\ contains realiza­
tions of variables that are known at the end of period t — 1.
We can divide (4.1) by var(Agdpt\Jt-i) to get:
1 — 0 c  +  Ps "b Pu
where
Pc 1 1
cov(Agdp -  A  gnp, A gdp)
0s cov(Agnp — Ac, A  gdp) \It-ivar(Agdp\2t- i)L^J cov(Ac, A  gdp)
(4.2)
The individual coefficients in 0  can now be associated with various channels of risk 
sharing. The GDP-GNP differential reflects international factor income flow's. Hence, 0C 
measures to what extent capital income from abroad covaries with GDP. Therefore, 0C 
can be thought of as representing the cross-sectional dimension of consumption insurance 
that is achieved (primarily) through cross-border ownership of foreign assets, i.e. through 
international capital markets.3
The GNP-C differential measures savings and p s gives the contribution of the intertem­
poral aspect of consumption insurance (i.e. smoothing through savings). Finally, 0 V is the 
residual covariance between consumption growth and GDP growth, reflecting the undiversi­
fied or unsmoothed component of consumption.
We will now describe how w'e identify the conditional variances and covariances involved 
in (4.1). For this purpose, let
A gdpt
AX* =  Ngdpt -  Agnpt 
A gnpt — Ac*
Then we assume that
I t  = {XT}Ui (4-3)
and that expectations coincide with linear projections. These assumptions allow' us to 
express E(AXi|Xt_i) as a vector autoregression. The unexpected component of A X t wdiich 
w'e will denote by et is now' given by the reduced-form residual of the VAR:
$ (L )A X t=  et (4.4)
3As Sorensen and Yosha (1998) note, labour income flows between industrialised countries are negligible. 
The same holds true for interest payments on international bonds and loans. We can therefore think of the 
GDP-GNP differential as a good proxy for contingent capital income such as equity returns.
124 CHAPTER 4. RISK-SHARING IN THE SHORT RUN AND IN THE LONG RUN
where 4>(L) is a 3 x 3 matrix polynomial in the lag operator, L, which satisfies the 
condition that the roots of det(4>(z)) lie outside the unit circle.
Now let H denote the variance-covariance matrix of et and let be the entry in the 
i-th  row and j -th column of H. Then
o  ^21 . o  ^31¡3C =  —  and (3S = -----
u n v u
Of course, the analogue of ¡3U is given by
! - j S e - A (4.5)
We can now generalize our approach to arbitrary forecast horizons in order to answer the 
question as to what the role of various channels for risk sharing at these horizons may be. 
The mean squared prediction error in a VAR, k periods ahead, is given by
fc-i
*(fc) =  MSPEk =  £ c , n c ;
1=0
(4.6)
where the Q  are the matrix coefficients of the moving average representation of A X t.
Let the entries of ’i'(fc) be denoted by Then the analogue of /3 from above can
be defined:
^21W __ j a n-\ __ ^31W£«(*) = and 0,(k) -
and again
ipn(k) 9 Vhi(k) 
/3u(k) = l - 0 c( k ) - 0 ,( k )
and
W ) - [ & ( * )  f l . (k )  /?„(*) j '
Obviously, ¡5(1) — (3 because Co= I and therefore T'(l) =  f t .
Note also that as the forecast horizon gets infinite, ¡3(k) should converge to the uncondi­
tional /3 that emerges from the static ASY model. Hence, the basic ASY regression provides 
a check of specification for any VAR estimation that may provide the basis for the dynamic 
decomposition given in (4.6). We are now going to deal with estimation issues.
4.2.1 PVAR Estimation
A naive application to an individual country of the procedure outlined in the previous section, 
is not likely to yield meaningful results. Estimating separate VARs for each country would 
not allow us to control for country fixed effects, possibly leading to seriously biased estimates.
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Also, we need to take into account time varying fixed effects that are common to a whole 
cross-section of countries. This is because common or global shocks cannot be insured and 
we have to make sure that they do not pollute our estimates. We will therefore employ panel 
techniques in order to identify country-specific and time-specific components by exploiting 
not only the time series but also the cross-sectional dimension. As our sample period is 
relatively short - we employ annual data from 1975 to 1990 - we will rely on dynamic panel 
methods that are robust to short samples, i.e. require only cross-sectional asymptotics.
To see the problems that are associated with estimating this type of dynamic panel model, 
write out the standard reduced-form representation (4.4) to get
p
A X t=  /it +  A X t_j+ef t — p +  1, ...,T  (4.7)
i=i
Reinterpreting this as a system of panel equations yields
p
A X a= ^  +  ^ * i A X iil.,+ A i +  / i +  uit ¿ =  1......K-,t = p + l , . . . ,T  (4.8)
1 = 1
where nowr all variables vary by i and t, and where f t is the vector of country-specific ef­
fects and At is a time-specific effect. Since A Xii is a function of ƒ*, A X ^t-iis also a function 
of ƒ,. Therefore, A X ^ - i ,  a right-hand regressor in (4.8), is correlated with the error term. 
This renders the OLS estimator biased and inconsistent even if the are not serially corre­
lated. For the standard fixed effects (FE) estimator, the ’within’ transformation wipes out the 
country-specific effects ƒ*, but (A X i|t_i — AX^.-i ) where A X ^ .-i = A X i|t_ i/(T  -  1) 
will still be correlated with (u^ — u ir) even if the ui( are not serially correlated. This is 
because u»,. contains u ^ -i which is correlated with A X ^t-i by construction. In the tech­
nical appendix, wre describe howr w-e have used instrumental variables techniques following 
the method set out by Holtz-Eakin, Newey and Rosen (1988) to estimate the model given 
in (4.8).
In the remainder of this section, we are going to discuss how w'e can incorporate perma­
nent and transitory shocks in the VAR-model (4.8). Since in what follow's, panel notation 
will generally not be required, we will henceforth drop the index i or the fixed effects in our 
discussion.
4.2.2 Permanent shocks and risk sharing
Our interest in this paper is in the comovement of growth rates of consumption and various 
output aggregates. Still,it is possible that the levels of these variables may have feedback
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effects on the growth rates. To the extent that output and consumption are likely to fol­
low integrated processes, such feedbacks from the level-variables would imply cointegrating 
relations between the variables.
In standard models of economic growth cointegrating relationships will most likely arise 
in the form of a stationary ’great ratio’ of consumption over output (see for example King et 
al. (1991) and Neusser (1991)). In our setup, the great ratio is just given by the difference 
c — gnp4. A formal test based on the dynamic panel OLS procedure suggested by Nelson 
and Sul (2001) strongly rejected the null of no cointegration between idiosyncratic GNP and 
consumption. We therefore decided to add this variable as an error correction term to the 
panel VAR model given in (4.14). Our model accordingly looks as follows:
AX* =  S A X * -! +  7  +  cit (4.9)
where 6'  ~  £ 0 0 — 1 J is the cointegrating vector and 7  =  £ 7 j 72 73 j represents the 
vector of adjustment coefficients.
An error-correction model such as (4.9) allows the identification of permanent and tran­
sitory disturbances without further identifying assumptions. Following Johansen (1995), the 
permanent shocks can be written as
Kit = 7j.£u (4-10)
whereas the transitory disturbances are identified by requiring that they be orthogonal 
to the space of permanent shocks. Hence
r it = 7  (4.11)
Note that whenever nt or rt are non-scalar, the permanent or transitory shocks are not 
identified among themselves. However, for our purposes, this does not matter. The share of 
the forecast error variance that is explained by all permanent or transitory shocks does not 
depend on how we identify each of these shocks individually.
To see this assume that and S T are appropriately dimensioned non-singular matrices 
such that 7To =  Sff7r and To =  STr . Let furthermore, as in the non-cointegrated case, C(L)
4We measure the great ratio as C / G N P ,  not, as is common, as C /G D P . The reason for this is, that 
at least in principle, a country’s GDP and consumption can diverge arbitrarily if foreigners own perpetual 
claims on a sufficiently large share of that country’s income. This is exactly what we should see if risk sharing 
was perfect.
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be the reduced form matrix polynomial giving the Wold-representation of (4.9). Then the 
structural, i.e. just-identified form is given by C (L)P-1 where
P  =
S r j 'f l '1
is just the matrix mapping the reduced-form disturbances into their permanent and transi­
tory components.
It is easily verified that
P “1 = [ n 7 ±(7/±n 7 JL)-1s ; 1 7(7/f l -17 )”1s ; i ]
r YThen note that the covariance of ttq tq is given by
E  -
0
0 ST7'i2 !7 S t 
Hence, the mean-square prediction error is
k—1
*(*) = £ c ,  [n7±(7in7±)-,y±n+7(yn-17)_1y] q (4.12)
1=0
where the first term in parentheses measures the contribution of permanent shocks and the 
second the transitory. It can be seen from (4.12) that ty(k) is independent of any particular 
choice of S* and S T. Hence, the relative contributions of permanent and transitory shocks 
do not depend on the particular just-identification chosen.
We are going to report the estimation results for the cointegrated panel VAR and the 
ensuing decomposition of the prediction error in section 4.
4.3 Data and Empirical Implementation
We used annual per capita data for GDP, GNP and consumption (C), for 23 industrial 
countries, from the Penn World Tables (PWT, release 5.6). We generated world per capita 
aggregates of each of the three variables using population data from the same source. Annual 
observations on all three variables were available for the period 1970*90. In our estimation, 
we included only the period 1975*90 in order to avoid potential parameter instability in the 
model that is bound to arise if the oil shock and the aftermath of the demise of Bretton- 
Woods was included. Following Sorensen and Yosha (1998), we did not extend the sample
*aBMB*aaw saw?
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beyond 1990 to avoid instability problems that are likely to arise from German unification. 
These limitations make the sample rather short, but our econometric methods, in particular 
the instrumentalisation following Holtz-Eakin, Newey and Rosen (1988), axe designed to 
cope with small time dimensions. ^
We transformed all data into log first differences to generate growth rates. Then, to I 
account for the potential role of global shocks that may create uninsurable output variability, 
we formulated the data for each country relative to the global aggregate. In the setup of the 
panel, we multiplied the data of each country by its population weight. The description of 
variables from the PWT data base and the list of countries are given in the data appendix.
We then proceeded to the panel estimation of the vector autoregressions given in (4.9), 
using the method suggested by Holtz-Eakin, Newey and Rosen, as described in the previous 
subsection and the technical appendix. In the estimation, we included time-specific fixed 
effects to account for any remaining cross-sectional dependence and individual-specific fixed 
effects.
We used standard information criteria to determine the lag length of the VAR-model. 
Those generally suggested 1-2 lags. As an additional test of specification, we used the fact 
that, as k tends to infinity, j3(k) should converge to the unconditional /3, i.e. the vector of 
coefficients of the simple panel regressions on A gdp of A gdp — Agnp, Agnp — Ac and Ac 
respectively. This test generally required us to impose two lags which we used throughout, j 
We then inverted the VAR to generate forecast errors according to (4.6). We now discuss j 
the results of this exercise. j
I
4.4 Results j
In the selection of countries we used for our investigation, we deliberately only included ! 
industrialised economies. This is to ensure that countries are sufficiently homogenous to i 
warrant treatment in a single panel estimation. Our panel also includes several interesting 
sub-groupings and we will report results for these throughout. These sub-groups include the 
G7, the EU 15 and a core group of European economies. Again, the appendix provides more 
detail.
Table 4.1 provides the relative contributions of the intertemporal and the cross-sectional 
channels at various forecast horizons. j
It is a first interesting feature of our results that the relative contribution of the channels j 
does not vary over time. To save space, table 4.1 reports, the results for the one and three year j 
horizons only but the findings at other horizons are virtually identical. This is a remarkable !
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result that we found to be extremely robust to changes in the model specification. It may 
seem surprising that short-term and long-term risks are equally well insured. Intuitively, one 
might expect that various forms of capital market imperfections would lead to a ’short-term 
bias’ in consumption insurance. This does not seem to be the case.
Our results may also suggest that a fully specified dynamic econometric model such as 
the one put forward in this paper is required to get at the issue of dynamic risk sharing. 
Earlier contributions to the literature which admittedly were not primarily concerned with 
the dynamics of risk sharing, tended to use a short-cut to gauge risk sharing at different 
horizons: they typically look at data differenced at high and low frequencies. Using this 
method, S0rensen and Yosha (1998) find that the unsmoothed component at the three-years 
horizon is much larger (roughly 75 percent) than at the 1-year horizon (roughly 60 percent). 
In a similar way, Canova and Ravn (1996) report that lower frequency fluctuations in income 
are less insured than higher frequency fluctuations. The results in our paper, including those 
to be reported below for permanent and transitory shocks, demonstrate that these exercises 
provide a good estimate of how well-insured countries are against shocks of various degrees 
of persistence but not how well-insured they are against risks at different horizons.
The last column of table 4.1 reports the estimate of the unconditional model, i.e. practi­
cally a re-run of the Sorensen and Yosha (1998) procedure on our data. These unconditional 
estimates display the same pattern that was already found by Sorensen and Yosha (1998). 
Capital markets virtually do not matter for risk sharing, the bulk of insurance is provided 
through (intertemporal) self-insurance. Interestingly enough, our conditional estimates from 
the dynamic model find a somewhat more important role for international capital markets. 
However, once one takes account of the estimation uncertainty in the unconditional model, 
the respective results are not too far apart.
Overall, we find that the conditional estimates eventually converge to unconditional ones - 
at least after taking account of the relatively large estimation uncertainty in the unconditional 
model. This is reassuring as it provides a check of specification of our dynamic model as has 
been suggested in section two.
The VAR-based approach we have suggested in this paper allows us to examine an im­
portant assumption that underlies the ASY-approach: if the GDP-GNP differential and the 
GNP-Consumption differential actually serve as buffers for shocks to output, they should 
be driven by exactly the same shocks that drive GDP. In other words; the notion underly­
ing ASY and the related literature is that shocks originate in output fluctuations and get 
smoothed at various levels. But the various aggregates, i.e. the GDP-GNP differential and 
the GNP-C differential that act as buffers, should not themselves be the source of shocks.
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We can examine this assumption by conducting a principal components analysis of the 
shocks to our econometric model. If the presumption underlying the ASY approach is cor­
rect, then there should be a single dominant principal component in the reduced form errors 
that we get from the estimation of the VAR. Furthermore, this principal component should 
be highly correlated with innovations in the Apdp-equation of our model but virtually un­
correlated with innovations in the other two equations. I
In table 4.2, we give the share of the total variation in [Agdp, Agdp — Agnp, Agnp -  I 
Ac] that is explained by the first principal component of Q. As it turns out, we do find I 
a dominant principal component in the reduced-form errors for all groupings of countries I 
that we examine. We then also calculated the correlation of this principal component with | 
unexpected innovations in the Apdp-equation, i.e. cui as well as the Agdp — Agnp- and | 
Agnp — Ac-equations, £i2t and respectively.. These correlations are given in columns | 
2-4 of table 4.2. Our results suggest that, indeed, shocks to A gdp drive the joint dynamics | 
of [Agdp, A  gdp — Agnp, Agnp — Ac]. This is a very important finding as it demonstrates | 
the validity of our method and the static versions of it that have been used in ASY (1996), I 
Sorensen and Yosha (1998) and Melitz and Zumer (1999), I
I
4.4.1 Permanent and transitory shocks j
In table 4.3 we provide forecast error decompositions for the different sources of income | 
uncertainty, i.e. permanent and transitory shocks. 1
These decompositions are similar to the unconditional dynamic results we reported in | 
table 4.1 in that they do not vary over time. However, our results also reveal that there are  ^
important differences in the way that the various channels contribute to the sharing of risks , 
that arise from different sources of shocks. j
Firstly, permanent shocks are insured to a much lesser extent than transitory shocks. 
This finding is in line with earlier results in Canova and Ravn (1996) who also found that 
low-frequency risks seem to be insured less than high frequency fluctuations. In fact, when 
the panel VECM is estimated with all countries included, transitory shocks are found to 
be almost perfectly smoothed. We note that, very much as in the unconditional case, the 
forecast horizon does not matter for the extent of total insurance nor for the relative role of 
the channels.
Secondly, once wre consider the channels by which these shocks get insured, we find 
that insurance against transitory fluctuations is almost exclusively achieved through the 
intertemporal channel, whereas, in line with the findings by Sprensen and Yosha (1998), the 
role of capital markets remains limited.
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The results for transitory shocks tie in with recent empirical research by Kraay, Loayza, 
Serven and Ventura (2000) that suggests that the international component of most countries’ 
portfolios is heavily biased towards loans and bonds. On the theoretical side, Baxter and 
Crucini (1995) have shown that the full risk sharing allocations that ensue as equilibria in 
models with complete markets can be approximated by models that feature only non-state- 
contingent assets. This result holds as long as shocks are not too persistent. Our results 
highlight the empirical relevance of the Baxter and Crucini study: even though individual 
countries’ international portfolios show a huge home bias, they seem sufficiently diversified 
to achieve almost full insurance against transitory output risks. This insurance seems to 
be achieved largely with bonds and international credit rather than equity or other state 
contingent assets.
The results we obtained for permanent shocks are particularly interesting in two respects. 
First, when the model is estimated with data from all countries, the intertemporal and the 
cross-sectional channels play almost equal roles. Certainly, the bulk of permanent income 
risk remains uninsured, but the relative contributions to the amount of insurance that is 
eventually achieved is roughly equal for the cross-sectional and intertemporal channels. In 
particular, it is noteworthy that the intertemporal channel matters at all for the insurance 
against permanent risks. Models in which only the expected path of income matters for 
the savings decision will not be able to rationalize this feature of the data. Rather, income 
variability appears to matter in this case. Athanasoulis and Shiller (2000) have shown how 
the extent of observed precautionary saving depends on the degree of incompleteness of 
markets for claims on national income. Accordingly, we interpret our finding as evidence of 
precautionary savings.
When the model is estimated with only a subgroup of countries, our results are generally 
confirmed. One particular point may be wTorth mentioning, though:
The role of the cross-sectional channel, i.e. international capital markets, for the insurance 
against permanent shocks is less pronounced in all of the sub-groups than it is when the 
model is estimated with all 23 countries. The sub-groups are more homogenous in terms of 
country-size than is the whole panel. Our results could suggest that risk sharing through 
international equity markets is more pronounced between countries of different size. In this 
respect, our results are in line with Lane (2000) wrho has found that smaller countries tend 
to hold more foreign equity than do larger countries.
Summarizing this section, we can say that, in annual data, permanent output fluctuations 
account for just below eighty percent of total output variability and that only twenty percent 
of these fluctuations are insured. Hence, we find that at least 60 percent of total output
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variability is uninsured. This is in line with the results obtained by Sorensen and Yosha.
Our findings complement theirs in that it seems that most of this uninsured component is 
due to uninsured permanent shocks. This raises the question why international capital and 
credit markets do so poorly in insuring people’s consumption against permanent shocks in 
income. j
4.5 Conclusion |
I
In this paper, we have investigated in which way industrial countries insure against output | 
fluctuations. In so doing, we have offered two important novelties. j
The first is that we consider how* risks are insured at various horizons, thus providing a | 
dynamic version of the method first proposed by Asdrubali, Sprensen and Yosha (1996). Our | 
results corroborate the notion of a home bias in international risk sharing, even for forecast | 
horizons as low as a year. |
Secondly, we also find evidence that an important share of the variation in idiosyn- j 
cratic output and consumption may be of a permanent nature. Permanent shocks need to j 
be insured through perpetual claims. The French-Poterba observation of a  home bias in j 
international equity portfolios may suggest that most countries are badly insured against | 
permanent fluctuations in their income streams. Once we allow for non-stationarities in our | 
data set, our findings are consistent with this view: there is generally little insurance against | 
permanent shocks but transitory risk in output is almost completely insured, mainly via I 
national and international credit markets. ■
The second finding is in line with recent empirical evidence that suggests that inter­
national portfolios do not only display a home bias but are also severely biased towards ( 
non-state contingent assets such as bonds and loans. A theoretical rationalization for our ( 
results may be given by Baxter and Crucini (1995), who demonstrated that full risk-sharing | 
allocations can be approximated quite wfell in economies with imperfect capital markets as f 
long as shocks are not too persistent.
Our aim in this paper wras to draw a map of an area of our ignorance, i.e. howT countries 
share risks at various time horizons. We have not put forward any particular theory of w'hat 
the intertemporal pattern of risk sharing should look like. However, any theoretical model 
of the home bias should also reproduce the fact that the relative importance of risk sharing 
channels does not vary over time. This may, for example, be an important restriction on 
transaction-cost based explanations of the home bias as the presence of (fixed) transactions 
costs may w'ell imply that the relative roles of intertemporal smoothing and cross-sectional
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insurance vary with the forecast horizon.
Another issue that our results may raise is why permanent and transitory shocks are 
insured in such different ways. Apparently, permanent shocks are much harder to insure 
internationally than axe transitory shocks. Why this should be the case is not immediately 
clear but it is what the data tell us. One intuition is that there is that the risk of reneging - 
on the
part of the insurer - is much higher with permanent shocks. We plan to further address 
this question in future research.
4.6 Appendix
4.6.1 Data Appendix
All data are from the Penn World Tables release 5.6
Variable PWT-code Line#
GDP cgdp 9
GNP rgnp 27
C cc 10
Population pop 1
The sample range is 1970-90.
List of Countries:
1. Canada, 2. United States, 3. Japan, 4. Austria, 5. Belgium, 6. Denmark , 7. 
Finland, 8. France, 9. Germany (West), 10. Greece, 11. Iceland, 12. Ireland, 13. Italy, 
14. Luxemburg ,15. Netherlands, 16. Norway, 17. Portugal, 18. Spain, 19. Sweden, 20. 
Switzerland, 21. United Kingdom, 22. Australia, 23. New Zealand
G7: countries #1,2,3,8,9,13,21
EU 15: countries #4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,17,18,19,21
EU core: countries #4,5,8,9,14,15
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4.6.2 Technical Appendix
Anderson and Hsiao (1982) were the first authors to present a solution to the problem 
of estimating dynamic panel data models. For the case of a univariate AR(1), they sug­
gested first differencing the model to get rid of the country-specific effects ƒ* and then using 
(A X iii_2 -  A X ,,(-3) or simply A X ^-2  as an instrument for (A X ijt_i — A X i,^ )-  These 
instruments will not be correlated with (Ui)t — Ui)t_i). This instrumental variables (IV) esti­
mation method leads to consistent but not necessarily efficient estimates of the parameters 
of the model. In the sequel, several other studies (e.g. Arellano and Bond, 1991) suggested 
instruments leading to more efficient estimates. The above-mentioned problems are not 
specific to VARs.
In a landmark paper, Holtz-Eakin, Newey and Rosen (1988) - HNR for short - explained 
how to estimate VARs in a panel framework and proposed an IV type estimation procedure 
which we will now briefly explain.5
The specification of (4.8) as a projection implies that the error term Ui( satisfies the 
orthogonality condition
£ (A X ;su*] =£7[f/u*] s e t (4.13)
We can exploit these orthogonality conditions to identify the parameters of the model. 
Taking first differences on (4.8), we obtain
A Ku ”  AXjt-i — Af 4- y > , ( A X , t_, — A X ^z-iJ+V it (4.14)
i=i
i =  1 , . . . ,K \t  =  p +  2 ,.. .,T  (4.15)
where
At ~  Xt — (4*16)
V ii =
We will now discuss identification of the parameters of the transformed equation (4.14) 
and then see how the original parameters can be recovered.
The orthogonality conditions of equation (4.13) imply that the error term of the trans­
formed equation (4.14) satisfies the orthogonality condition
5Holtz-Eakin et al. deal with the more general case of an interacted country-specific and time effect Atfi 
and with time-varying coefficients.
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E ’AXJ.vu] = E ï ; v li! s < t 1 (4.17)
Therefore,
Z„ = ¡c, (AX,,_2 -  A X , ( A X j . i - 1  -  AXm.,) ,  (AX,2 -  AX;1)]
qualify as instrumental variables. The original parameters are identified if T > p +  
3.6 Note that the number of instruments increases with t. Thus, the HNR estimator is 
more efficient than an IV estimator based on once-lagged endogenous variables alone (as in 
Anderson and Hsiao, 1982).
Estimation yields the coefficients [ $ i ,..., and we can calculate the variance-covariance
matrix 12“ of the transformed system. Using (4.16), we are able to recover the variance- 
covariance matrix of the original system. The estimated coefficients [ $ i , $ pj can be used 
to obtain the coefficient matrices Ci of the moving average representation. Finally, we can 
compute the mean squared prediction error using (4.6) from which the results in the main 
text follow immediately.
6Alternatively, following Arellano (1989) we used * level” values Ztt — [e, AX, t_2, AXjit_3, A X ^ ]  as 
instruments in which case we also gain one more period for estimation because in this case identification 
only requires T  > p ~  2. The results, however are very similar which we consider a robustness check of our 
empirical strategy.
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Table 4.1: Risk Sharing a t various horizons
Country group Forecast Horizon in years Unconditional
1 3 Model
a) All Pc 0.09 (0.004) 0.09 (0.004) 0.001 (0.03)
@s 0.29 (0.002) 0.29 (0.002) 0.32 (0.14)
*>) G T fie -0 .0 3  (0.01) -0 .03  (0.01) 0.01 (0.03)
fis 0.51 (0.04) 0.51 (0.04) 0.33 (0.13)
<0 EU15 fie 0.004 (0.01) 0.004 (0.01) -0 .0 2  (0.04)
0 s 0.19 (0.05) 0.19 (0.05) 0.21 (0.18)
d) EU core Pc -0 .0 2  (0.02) -0 .0 2  (0.02) -0 .0 2  (0.04)
Ps 0.33 (0.09) 0.33 (0.09) 0.34 (0.18)
Values in parentheses are standard deviations.
For the unconditional model these are asymptotic whereas for the dynamic 
model they have been obtained using 100 bootstrap replications.
Table 4.2: Share of first principal component
and correlation with  GDP shocks__________
Variance Correlation of 1* PC with
explained by 1. PC £m t&t £¿3*
All 91% 0.99 -0.09 0.00
G7 94% 0.99 -0.13 0.00
Euro 15 77% 0.99 -0.13 0.00
EU core 78% 0.97 -0.23 0.00
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Tabic 4.3: Sm oothing of perm anent and transitory  shocks
Country group Type of shock Variance share
permanent transitory of perm, shocks
a) All 3c 0.10 (0.005) 0.03 (0.01)
as 0.11 (0.03) 0.91 (0.30) 0.77 (0.03)
b) G7 3c -0 .0 5  (0.02) -0 .0 3  (0.03)
3 s 0.3G (0.0G) 0.9G (0.32) 0.72 (0.05)
c) EU15 3c -0 .0 0 7  (0.02) 0.03 (0.03)
3s 0.51 (0.07) -0.G 2 (0.38) 0.70 (0.01)
d) EU core 3c -0 .1 5  (0.05) 0.11 (0.05)
3s 0.01 (0.19) 0.62 (0.26) 0.49 (0.09)
Standard errors (in parentheses) were obtained from 
100 bootstrap replications of the model
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A ppendix A  
The GSOEP data
The GSOEP is a representative longitudinal sample of thepopulation residing in Germany 
and contains socioeconomic information on private households.1 It began in 1984 with a 
sample of 12.215 respondents in 5.921 households in the western states of Germany. It 
consisted of two randomly sampled subgroups. The German Subsample consists of people in 
private households where the head of household is not Turkish, Greek, Yugoslavian, Spanish, 
or Italian nationality (the five largest groups of foreign nationals). The Foreign Subsample 
consists of people in private households where the head of household is of Turkish, Greek, 
Yugoslavian, Spanish, or Italian nationality.1 2 In 1990, already before official unification, 
the first wave of the East German Subsample was added. It includes individuals in private 
households where the head of household is/was a citizen of the German Democratic Republic. 
In 1995, a special sample of immigrants was for the first time interviewed. In 1998, a 
refreshment sample was independently drawn, covering the same target population as the 
existing four subsamples, thereby considerably increasing the overall sample size. By now 
there are thus five different subsamples which can be aggregated using design weights.
All households members aged 16 years or older are interviewed face-to-face and asked 
their personal situation. The household head3 additionally provides information on housing, 
housing costs, different sources of income and on children under 16 years old.
In this thesis, I only use the West-German and foreign subsamples for two main reasons,
1 This section draws on several official publications by the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW) 
and on Wagner, Burkhauser and Behringer (1993).
2Note that the foreign sample consists of people who came to Germany in the 1950’s and 1960’s already 
and have therefore already assimilated to the native German population. In contrast, the immigrant sample 
(see below) includes foreigners wrho only recently came to Germany.
3 The head of the household is de ned as the person who knows best about the general conditions under 
which the household acts and is supposed to answer this questionnaire in each given year.
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The longitudinal dimension of these subsamples is longer than for the East German and 
immigrant samples which is crucial for the chapter on displacement. It is also crucial for the 
chapter on returns to education that contains information about place of childhood only in 
the 1985 wave and information on parental background only in the 1986 wave. Problems in 
comparability of the West- and East-German school systems also makes the West-German 
and foreign subsample a natural choice in the chapter on university dropouts.
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